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Kiobel, Extraterritoriality, and the ―Global 
War on Terror‖ 
 
CRAIG MARTIN† 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
For the purpose of exploring the issues of extraterritoriality 
raised in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., this project sought to 
examine how the federal courts have considered extraterritoriality in 
cases arising in the so-called “global war on terror” (GWOT). The 
inquiry leads to some new and arguably important observations 
about extraterritoriality in the GWOT policies and related 
jurisprudence. 
The plaintiffs in Kiobel claimed, under the Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS), that the defendant corporations were liable for complicity in 
Nigeria‟s conduct of indefinite detention, torture, and extrajudicial 
killing. The U.S. Supreme Court departed from the issue of corporate 
liability under international law to question whether the ATS, when 
invoked in cases involving foreign litigants for conduct abroad (so-
called “foreign-cubed” cases), was an extraterritorial exercise of 
jurisdiction, in violation of domestic presumptions or international 
law principles on jurisdiction. The move was surprising because the 
application of the ATS is arguably a permissible exercise of 
adjudicative jurisdiction, rather than an impermissible exercise of 
prescriptive or enforcement jurisdiction.  
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In exploring this move in Kiobel this Article set out to examine 
how the federal courts have approached issues of extraterritoriality 
in claims of indefinite detention, torture, and extrajudicial killing 
arising in response to the GWOT. This inquiry suggests that the 
government conduct giving rise to these GWOT cases itself 
constituted the extraterritorial exercise of U.S. prescriptive and 
enforcement jurisdiction in foreign territory. Moreover, in many 
instances the conduct was arguably undertaken without clear 
congressionial approval or other legal authority, and was thus likely 
in violation of both the international law principles limiting the 
exercise of domestic jurisdiction abroad, and the domestic 
presumption against extraterritoriality.  
The second observation arising from the inquiry is that the 
courts, the relevant bar, and the academy have not acknowledged or 
sufficiently examined the extent to which this government conduct 
was an extraterritorial application of U.S. law and policy. Rather, all 
the focus, by both the courts and the academy, is on whether U.S. 
rights can apply extraterritorially to protect the foreign claimants in 
these cases. Strictly limiting the extraterritorial application of U.S. 
legal rights, the courts have not questioned the application of U.S. 
law and policy that gave rise to those rights claims in the first place.  
There is also a stark contrast between the manner in which the 
courts apply standards, canons of statutory construction, and various 
doctrines, in legitimizing the government conduct and immunizing 
U.S. defendants from claims on the one hand, and in limiting the 
availability of U.S. legal rights, and operation of the ATS itself, on 
the other hand. Moreover, with respect to the key issue of nexus, 
which is core to the decision in Kiobel, the courts seem to apply very 
different standards.  
The Article explores some of the arguments for why the U.S. 
conduct in these GWOT cases is not impermissibly extraterritorial, 
and thus why the courts ought not be concerned. But even if in the 
specifics of each case the doctrinal treatment is correct, given the 
contrast between the approach of the Court to extraterritoriality in 
Kiobel to that of the courts in the GWOT cases, it is argued that the 
issues nonetheless deserve more analysis and debate. While Kiobel 
may have left the ATS dead to claimants in foreign-cubed cases, it 
may lead to renewed inquiry into the legitimacy of the extraterritorial 
exercise of U.S. jurisdiction in the GWOT. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
1
 generated a great deal of 
interest even before it was argued in the U.S. Supreme Court, and 
much more will be written about it in the wake of the Court‘s rather 
surprising judgment. Much of the analysis will focus on whether 
anything remains of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS),
2
 what impact the 
case will have on international human rights, and the extent to which 
the opinions in the judgment, and particularly their discussion of 
extraterritoriality, are consistent with prior ATS jurisprudence. This 
Article, written for a symposium on the case held after oral argument 
at the Supreme Court but prior to the judgment,
3
 began as an inquiry 
 
1. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
3. While this volume is being published after the judgment was rendered, and some 
revisions were permitted in light of the judgment, the symposium was held, and the bulk of 
the writing was done, before the case was decided. 
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into some of these questions, with a focus on the extraterritoriality 
issue. The Court‘s inquiry into that issue was surprising, because 
there are some good reasons to think that the ATS does not give rise 
to impermissibly extraterritorial exercises of U.S. jurisdiction. The 
research for this Article thus began by looking at how the federal 
courts have treated extraterritoriality in other cases involving the 
kinds of human rights violations raised in Kiobel, particularly in the 
context of the so-called ―global war on terror‖ (GWOT). The idea 
was that such an examination might provide some insights into why 
and how the Court had focused on the issue of extraterritoriality in 
Kiobel. But in the end, the examination of those cases through the 
lens of the Court‘s treatment of extraterritoriality in Kiobel leads to 
some potentially new and important observations regarding how 
extraterritoriality is understood in the context of the GWOT.  
In short, the first observation is that the U.S. conduct giving rise 
to the GWOT cases itself constitutes extraterritorial exercises of U.S. 
jurisdiction. In many cases this conduct lacks sufficiently clear 
congressionial or other relevant legal authority, which suggests that 
such conduct may violate domestic presumptions against 
extraterritoriality, and international law principles on jurisdiction. 
Yet, the courts, and the academy, have focused on whether U.S. legal 
rights and other protections can be applied extraterritorially to benefit 
such claimants, while apparently ignoring the fact that the policy 
against which they seek protection is itself an extraterritorial exercise 
of U.S. jurisdiction. Moreover, there is a stark contrast in how the 
courts have applied standards and relevant doctrine when considering 
the authority for U.S. conduct in the GWOT, as compared to the strict 
standards and doctrine applied in both Kiobel itself, and in the 
consideration of the rights claims of foreign claimants in the GWOT. 
By way of background, Kiobel was an ATS class action in which 
the plaintiffs argued that the defendant corporations were liable for 
torture, crimes against humanity, extrajudicial killing, arbitrary 
detention, and other violations of international law committed by 
agents of the government of Nigeria.
4
 The ATS provides federal 
courts with jurisdiction to adjudicate tort claims made by foreigners 
for the violation of a narrow range of well-established principles of 
international law.
5
 While enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
the ATS was virtually unheard of until it was first employed to 
 
4. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662–63. 
5. See infra text accompanying notes 41–45. 
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advance human rights claims in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala.
6
 In Filártiga, 
the family of a Paraguayan national, who had been tortured to death 
in Paraguay, won redress against the responsible former government 
agent for the tort arising from the violation of the international law 
prohibition against torture.
7
 
The narrow issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in Kiobel was 
whether corporations had sufficient legal personality under 
international law to be held liable for such violations.
8
 But in the 
course of oral argument the Court deviated from that narrow issue to 
delve more deeply into fundamental questions about the scope of the 
ATS, and whether its operation is an impermissible extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law.
9
 The Court ordered a briefing of these new 
issues and reargument of the case several months later.
10
 In 
particular, the Court questioned whether ATS claims made by 
foreigners for the conduct of other foreigners, perpetrated within 
foreign territory (so-called ―foreign-cubed‖ cases), constituted an 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law in violation of the domestic 
presumption against extraterritoriality and the international law 
principles governing jurisdiction.
11
 Thus, the central issue of 
corporate liability under international law was shunted to one side, 
and extraterritoriality under international law and the legitimate scope 
of the ATS became the focus of the case.
12
 In the course of argument 
and reargument it became clear that the continued validity of a whole 
line of ATS cases involving the conduct of foreign actors abroad, 
stretching back to the seminal case of Filártiga itself, might be in 
jeopardy.  
In the final result, in which the plaintiffs‘ claims were dismissed, 
 
6. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
7. Id. at 878. 
8. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663. 
9. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491) (argued 
February 28, 2012); Transcript of Oral Reargument, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491) 
(argued October 1, 2012). 
10. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (mem.). 
11. See infra Parts II.A–B. 
12. There is a certain irony in this. The Court did much the same thing, deviating from 
the issue on appeal and ordering reargument, in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 
(2010), in which of course the Court held that corporations enjoyed some of the same 
constitutional rights as natural persons. There would have been further irony had the Court in 
Kiobel held that corporations do not, however, enjoy sufficient legal personality to be held 
liable for violations of international law. 
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the majority grounded its decision in the domestic law presumption 
against extraterritoriality,
13
 while the concurring minority focused on 
the international law principles on jurisdiction.
14
 The domestic law 
presumption against extraterritoriality was itself founded on a respect 
for international law principles on jurisdiction, and thus, while 
differing in focus, the overall judgment was grounded in the 
relationship between the ATS and the international legal system. This 
apparent concern about extraterritoriality seems somewhat strange, in 
part because the application of the ATS in Kiobel is, arguably, 
entirely consistent with the Court‘s own interpretation of the 
relationship between the statute and international law in its seminal 
ATS decision Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.
15
 Moreover, the 
interpretation of that relationship in Sosa is itself consistent with 
international law principles on jurisdiction.  
Reasonable people can and do disagree on this. There will 
continue to be much debate over the technical arguments regarding 
extraterritoriality, and the international law principles governing 
jurisdiction as they relate to this case. But given that there are 
reasonable arguments that the application of the ATS in foreign-
cubed cases, such as Kiobel, would be consistent with Sosa and 
international law principles, it was surprising for the Court to depart 
from the corporate liability issue in order to raise the issue of 
extraterritoriality. The Court‘s focus on extraterritoriality leads 
naturally to an inquiry into how the Supreme Court, and other federal 
courts, have treated issues of extraterritoriality and respect for 
international law principles on jurisdiction in other cases that involve 
claims similar to those raised in Kiobel—that is, claims arising from 
the violations of international law principles that form jus cogens 
norms, and which are recognized under Sosa as grounding ATS 
claims. Such an inquiry leads one to wonder how, for instance, the 
courts have considered extraterritoriality and compliance with the 
international law principles on jurisdiction in cases involving claims 
similar to those raised in Kiobel, but arising in response to U.S. 
conduct in the GWOT.  
This Article set out to explore that line of inquiry. But what 
began as an inquiry aimed at providing insights into the Court‘s 
approach in Kiobel, developed into more of an examination of this 
 
13. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
14. Id. at 1673–74 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
15. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
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sample of GWOT cases through the lens of the Court‘s treatment of 
extraterritoriality in Kiobel. Rather than the GWOT cases shedding 
light on Kiobel, thinking about the approach towards 
extraterritoriality in Kiobel provided some insights into our 
understanding of GWOT jurisprudence. In particular, the inquiry 
revealed some important and surprising features regarding an 
apparent failure to address the issue of extraterritoriality in the 
context of the GWOT. The most important observation is that the 
actions of the government of the United States against suspected 
terrorists, specifically policies of indefinite detention, enhanced 
interrogation techniques, extraordinary rendition and torture, and 
even targeted killing, itself constituted an extraterritorial application 
of U.S. law. Moreover, at times such conduct was, arguably, 
undertaken without clear congressionial approval or other relevant 
legal authority. As will be explored below, it is arguably the case that 
in many of these instances none of the Authorization for Use of 
Military Force (AUMF)
16
 enacted shortly after the 9/11 attacks, or 
any other U.S. legislation, or indeed the international law of armed 
conflict, can be said to clearly authorize the U.S. actions. This would 
suggest that in some cases at least, the conduct was an impermissibly 
extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction. 
A second and related observation, is that the federal courts 
(including the Supreme Court), the litigants themselves, and even the 
scholars writing on the GWOT jurisprudence, have not sufficiently 
recognized the extent to which the government action in relation to 
these claimants constitutes an extraterritorial exercise of U.S. 
jurisdiction. Given the Court‘s questions and analysis in Kiobel, one 
would have expected that some inquiry would have been required in 
several of these GWOT cases into whether the government conduct 
in detaining, interrogating, or targeting the claimants represented an 
impermissible exercise of U.S. jurisdiction abroad. Yet there was 
none. Indeed, when the federal courts have dealt with issues of 
extraterritoriality in the context of rights claims made in GWOT 
cases, the focus has been almost exclusively on whether rights under 
U.S. law can be extended abroad. Scholarship too has focused 
narrowly on this debate. Thus, while everyone is preoccupied with 
the possibility and extent of extraterritorial application of rights, there 
 
16. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 
note (2006)). 
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has been no corresponding judicial concern or even inquiry into how 
those very rights claims, many of them advanced under the ATS, 
sought protection against the extraterritorial application of U.S. law. 
Indeed, neither the jurisprudence nor the related academic literature, 
nor even the lawyers for the claimants, seem to have recognized this 
somewhat paradoxical feature of several of these GWOT cases. 
A third observation is that there is a rather stark contrast between 
the generous and expansive approach of the federal courts in 
accepting the legitimacy of the government conduct in the GWOT on 
the one hand, and on the other hand the strict and narrow approach 
taken by the courts in dealing with the rights claims of the plaintiffs 
in the GWOT cases, and indeed by the Court in its analysis of 
extraterritoriality in Kiobel. This contrast is reflected in the different 
approaches to statutory interpretation taken by the courts in assessing 
congressionial intent and legal authority for government conduct, in 
the manner in which doctrine is employed, and perhaps most 
markedly in how the concept of nexus is developed and applied. One 
of the central arguments that is advanced for the rejection of foreign-
cubed ATS cases is that there is not a sufficient connection to the 
United States. It was indeed an element of the Court‘s judgment in 
Kiobel.
17
 The suggestion of such arguments being that the courts 
would be, and indeed should be, more open to adjudicating cases 
involving torture and other violations of jus cogens norms if the 
defendants were U.S. nationals, or there was otherwise a strong 
connection to the United States. But in several GWOT cases, in 
which American actors were defendants accused of such violations of 
international law, the courts have invoked and creatively extended 
various doctrines to block precisely such claims against the U.S. 
defendants.
18
 In contrast, the courts accept the most tenuous 
arguments of attenuated links to al-Qaeda, on scant and often dubious 
evidence, as grounds for detaining and interrogating claimants in the 
GWOT cases.
19
 
This Article begins in Part II with an explanation of the 
international law principles on the exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, as well as the U.S. domestic law presumptions on 
extraterritoriality. It explores how the ATS operates, and explains 
why the ATS is arguably not an extraterritorial exercise of 
 
17. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669; see also id. at 1671, 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring in the 
judgment).  
18. See infra Part III.C.  
19. See infra Part III.B. 
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prescriptive jurisdiction. Given that the Court thought otherwise in 
Kiobel, this gives rise to the question of how the courts have treated 
extraterritoriality in the context of the GWOT cases. Part III turns to 
that inquiry, beginning with an examination of how the sole concern 
over extraterritoriality in the GWOT cases has focused on questions 
of whether, and the extent to which, U.S. legal rights may be 
extended to foreigners abroad. It then moves to examine the cases 
involving claims of arbitrary detention, interrogation and torture, and 
extrajudicial killing, exploring in each case how the U.S. conduct 
arguably constitutes an exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction in 
violation of both international law principles on jurisdiction, and the 
domestic law presumptions against extraterritoriality. Moreover, the 
examination highlights the contrast between standards and doctrines 
employed by the courts depending upon which party‘s rights and 
privileges are at issue. Finally, in Part IV, the Article takes up some 
of the likely objections to this line of argument. It examines in turn 
whether the U.S. conduct can be explained as being authorized by the 
international law of armed conflict; whether it fits within the 
exceptions to the international law principles on jurisdiction; and 
whether it was in any event explicitly authorized by Congress, or 
alternatively was an exercise of the president‘s Commander-in-Chief 
powers, such that the domestic presumptions against 
extraterritoriality are rebutted. 
In the end, this brief exploration of how the courts have 
considered extraterritoriality in the context of the GWOT cases 
suggests a troubling disregard for U.S. violations of international law 
principles prohibiting the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction (in 
addition, of course, to the violation of international human rights law, 
which is the focus of much GWOT scholarship), which the Court 
purports to be concerned about in Kiobel. The Article begins by 
raising questions as to whether the Court was wrong in its analysis of 
the ATS and extraterritoriality in Kiobel, but it does not try to use the 
GWOT cases to make that argument; rather, in examining the GWOT 
cases through the lens of Kiobel, it suggests that we need to look 
more closely at how extraterritoriality has been ignored in the GWOT 
context. I cannot, within the scope of this Article, establish 
conclusively the pattern of disregard that I begin to examine here—
but this brief exploration of such patterns does raise questions about 
such disregard, which I argue is worth further consideration and 
analysis.  
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II. THE ATS AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
LAW  
One of the Court‘s primary issues during oral argument was 
whether the operation of the ATS in foreign-cubed cases violates the 
international law principles on jurisdiction, or was barred by the 
domestic presumption against extraterritoriality. I suggested above 
that the ATS, as it was interpreted by the Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain,
20
 is consistent with those principles, even when employed 
in foreign-cubed cases. Several other articles in this Volume provide 
a more detailed analysis of precisely why this is so, but to provide the 
basis for the discussion of the GWOT cases, I begin with a quick 
review of the foundation for this proposition.  
A. International Law Principles on Jurisdiction  
The principles of both public and private international law 
relating to jurisdiction reflect the desire to minimize conflicts 
between the laws of sovereign nations. Jurisdiction is a fundamental 
component of sovereignty, and to the extent it is exercised in relation 
to events or persons outside of the state‘s territory, there is a risk that 
it will infringe the sovereignty of another state. From the perspective 
of international law, the state‘s exercise of jurisdiction can be 
understood as having three aspects, namely: (1) prescriptive 
jurisdiction, which relates to the creation and operation of laws; (2) 
adjudicative jurisdiction which relates to the operation of judicial 
powers in interpreting and applying the law in resolution of disputes; 
and (3) enforcement jurisdiction, which relates to the conduct of the 
executive powers of the state in enforcing the laws and policies of the 
nation.
21
 Much of the controversy over extraterritoriality relates to the 
exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction in relation to conduct abroad—
the passage of laws that purport to govern conduct and persons 
outside of the territory of the state—and it is prescriptive jurisdiction 
that is at the heart of understanding the extraterritoriality issue in 
Kiobel.  
The starting presumption is that jurisdiction is territorial (the 
territorial principle), in that a state is entitled to exercise all three 
forms of jurisdiction without question within its own territory, and 
that there will be no interference within its territory by the exercise of 
 
20. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
21. See JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE‘S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
ch. 21 (8th ed. 2012) (explaining the international law principles relating to jurisdiction). 
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any other state‘s jurisdiction. In essence, international law may be 
said to generally limit the exercise of jurisdiction to the territory of 
the state, and to thus prohibit the exercise of prescriptive and 
enforcement jurisdiction in relation to conduct beyond the territory of 
the state, with some exceptions—some universally accepted, others 
controversial.
22
 The most clearly established exception is that states 
may exercise jurisdiction, even in relation to conduct or events 
outside its territory, in respect of its own nationals (the nationality 
principle). A second relatively well-established, if narrow, exception 
is that international law recognizes the right to exercise jurisdiction in 
situations requiring a legislative response to protect the state from a 
grave national security threat to the institutions of the state (the 
protective principle).
23
  
Less widely accepted but asserted in particular by the United 
States, is the right of states to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction to 
govern conduct abroad that is intended to have and does have 
significant effects within the territory of the state (the effects doctrine 
or objective territoriality principle).
24
 Even less well accepted, and 
more controversial, is the exercise of jurisdiction to address situations 
abroad in which the state‘s nationals are victims of crime (the passive 
 
22. In a number of amicus briefs filed in Kiobel this proposition was challenged on the 
basis of the judgment in S.S. ―Lotus‖ (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7), in 
which the Permanent Court of International Justice held that international law permits any 
exercise of jurisdiction within its territory in respect of conduct abroad that is not explicitly 
prohibited. The central holding of the case has been widely criticized, and contradicted in 
such later I.C.J. opinions as Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 
2002 I.C.J. 3, 78 (Feb. 14) (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, & 
Buergenthal) and Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 
3, at 169 (Feb. 14) (dissenting opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert). See IAN BROWNLIE, 
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 301–03 (4th ed. 1990). But see CRAWFORD, 
supra note 21, at 458. 
23. BROWNLIE, supra note 22, at 304; CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 462; see also 
Research in International Law, Harvard Law School, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime: 
Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT‘L L. 435, 439 (Supp. 
1935) [hereinafter Harvard Draft Convention]; Christopher W. Robbins, Finding Terrorists‟ 
Intent: Aligning Civil Antiterrorism Law with National Security, 83 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 1201, 
1213–30 (2009). 
24. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 402(1)(c) (1987); see also Robbins, supra note 23; Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional 
Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of National and 
International Law, 48 HARV. INT‘L. L.J. 121, 128 (2007); Jason Jarvis, Comment, A New 
Paradigm for the Alien Tort Statute Under Extraterritoriality and the Universality Principle, 
30 PEPP. L. REV. 671, 709 n. 252 (2003). 
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personality principle).
25
  
Finally, there is the conceptually distinct exception provided for 
in the principle of universal jurisdiction, which was also central to 
arguments advanced in Kiobel. This exception is well-established, but 
its scope and application remain in dispute.
26
 In essence, it provides 
that states may exercise jurisdiction in respect of violations of certain 
principles of international law, typically jus cogens norms of 
customary international law such as the prohibitions against torture, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, piracy, and trading in slaves.
27
 
Universal jurisdiction with respect to some violations is conferred by 
treaty, as with the Convention Against Torture,
28
 while jurisdiction 
over other violations is understood to exist as a matter of customary 
international law. Interestingly, U.S. courts have not accepted that 
terrorism is an international crime for which states may exercise 
universal jurisdiction.
29
 
I will return to the substance and scope of some of these 
principles later, when I examine possible justifications for the 
extraterritorial exercises of jurisdiction that give rise to the GWOT 
 
25. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 402 cmt. g (1987); see also MARY ELLEN O‘CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 828–29 
(2d ed. 1970); Geoffrey Watson, The Passive Personality Principle, 28 TEX. INT‘L L.J. 1, 
14–30 (1993); Joshua Robinson, United States Practice Penalizing International Terrorists 
Needlessly Undercuts Its Opposition to the Passive Personality Principle, 16 B.U. INT‘L L.J. 
487 (1998). 
26. Aside from open disputes as to when and for what offenses it may be available, there 
are some subtly different interpretations or understandings of the precise meaning of 
universal jurisdiction. Some argue that it constitutes the exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction 
by states in relation to violations of international law. See, e.g., Anthony J. Colangelo, The 
Legal Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 47 VA. J. INT‘L L. 149 (2006). Others, such as 
Brownlie, suggest that it is more accurately the application of domestic (municipal) law to 
proscribe and punish acts that are also unlawful under international law, and in respect of 
which international law confers a liberty upon states to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction. 
BROWNLIE, supra note 22, at 304–06. 
27. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 404 (1987). 
28. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; see also R v. Bow 
Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C. 
147 (H.L.) 198–201 (Browne-Wilkinson, L.J.), 204–05 (Millett, L.J.).   
29. See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 105–06 (2d Cir. 2003). But see 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 (1987) 
(defining ―Universal Jurisdiction to Define and Punish Certain Offenses‖ to include ―perhaps 
certain acts of terrorism‖). See generally Leila Sadat, Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, 
Realities, and Prospects: Redefining Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 241 
(2001); Colangelo, supra note 24. 
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cases.
30
 
B. The Domestic Presumptions  
Separate from the operation of the international law principles, 
but relevant to the question of whether the ATS constitutes an 
impermissibly extraterritorial application of U.S. law, are two 
presumptions in U.S. domestic law. The first is the presumption 
against extraterritoriality, which is traced back to Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.
31
 in 
1909. According to this doctrine, Congress is presumed not to intend 
statutes to apply extraterritorially, and thus courts will interpret 
legislation as having no extraterritorial application, unless Congress 
has explicitly expressed in the statute the intention that it apply 
outside U.S. territory.
32
 The corollary to this is that if Congress 
explicitly provides that some statutory provision is to have 
extraterritorial application, then the courts will interpret it 
accordingly, regardless of whether doing so would be inconsistent 
with international law principles on jurisdiction. In other words, the 
presumption is only triggered when the government purports to apply 
a statute to conduct or persons overseas, and that statute is silent or 
ambiguous on the issue of extraterritorial effect. Such is the theory, 
but of course it is not quite so clear-cut in practice. The courts have 
often found an implicit congressionial intention to have the law 
applied extraterritorially, if such application is thought necessary to 
fully achieve the objectives of the law.
33
 
The second presumption is referred to by the name of the 
nineteenth-century case in which it was established, Murray v. 
Schooner Charming Betsy.
34
 According to the Charming Betsy 
doctrine, an act of Congress is not to be construed in a manner 
inconsistent with international law, so long as any other interpretation 
is possible.
35
 As with the presumption against extraterritoriality, a 
law will be construed in a manner that would put the United States in 
 
30. Infra Part IV.B. 
31. 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909). 
32. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
33. See, e.g., United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922); United States v. Vasquez-
Velasco, 15 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1994); see infra note 220 and accompanying text. 
34. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). 
35. Id. at 118.  
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violation of international law if Congress has explicitly expressed the 
intent that the statute operate notwithstanding any inconsistency with 
international law. Put simply, under either presumption, the courts 
will give effect to statutes that violate the obligations of the United 
States under international law if it is clearly the intent of Congress to 
do so; but both presumptions were developed on the judicial 
understanding that generally Congress is presumed to respect, and to 
comply with, the principles of international law.  
The majority opinion in Kiobel held that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality applied to the ATS, and that there was insufficient 
evidence to support the notion that Congress had intended the ATS to 
apply to the conduct of foreigners occurring in foreign territory.
36
 
The concurring opinion of Justice Breyer, on the other hand, focused 
its attention on the international law principles regarding jurisdiction, 
and only agreed in the result based on the notion that there had to be 
a sufficient nexus to the interests of the U.S. to justify the exercise of 
jurisdiction.
37
 In considering the operation of the ATS, and the nature 
of the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction in the GWOT cases, I 
will consider both domestic and international law principles, though 
the emphasis will be on the international law principles. 
C. The Jurisdictional Operation of the ATS  
The question raised by the Court in Kiobel was whether the 
ATS, at least when applied in so-called foreign-cubed cases, would 
constitute an extraterritorial exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction, 
either in violation of the domestic law presumptions, or the principles 
of international law regarding jurisdiction. The ATS provides that 
―the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action 
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.‖38 It was argued by the 
defendants, and the governments of several states that filed amicus 
briefs,
39
 that the ATS constitutes the application of U.S. substantive 
 
36. 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). 
37. Id. at 1671, 1673–78 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
39. See, e.g., Brief of the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Kingdom of the Netherlands as Amici Curiae in Support of the 
Respondents, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491); Brief of the Governments of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491); Brief of 
the European Commission on Behalf of the European Union Supporting Neither Party, 
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491). 
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and remedial law to conduct in another country, and to nationals of 
foreign states,
40
 which is an exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction that 
cannot be justified by any of the principles of jurisdiction discussed 
above. But that position is arguably not consistent with the Court‘s 
own interpretation of the ATS in Sosa, nor with a line of lower court 
judgments stretching back to Filártiga.  
Sosa is most noted for the narrow limits it placed on the kind of 
international law violations that could ground a claim, but it also 
addressed the jurisdiction courts would exercise in adjudicating those 
claims. Beginning with the limits, the Court established that the ATS 
provided the district courts with jurisdiction to adjudicate cases 
involving violations of a very narrow sub-set of principles of 
customary international law (leaving aside the issue of treaties of the 
United States).
41
 That is, claims could only be made in respect of 
violations of those customary norms that are as well-established, 
clearly defined, and widely accepted today, as the specific crimes 
against the law of nations that had been in the contemplation of 
Congress in 1789, when the statute was enacted.
42
 Moreover, the 
better reading of Sosa suggests that the Court was also limiting the 
scope of the ATS to those principles of customary international law 
which are understood to give rise to individual liability or culpability 
in international law.
43
 The range of international law principles that 
the Court identified as falling within the scope of the ATS maps 
nicely onto the short list of customary international law norms that 
are most universally accepted as comprising jus cogens norms, 
namely: torture, piracy, a sub-set of war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, genocide, trading in slaves, and perhaps the crime of 
aggression.
44
 
The Court in Sosa also clarified the jurisdictional nature of the 
 
40. See Transcript of Oral Reargument, supra note 9, at 34–35; Supplemental Brief of 
the United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial Support of Affirmance at 2, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 
1659 (No. 10-1491). 
41. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004). 
42. Id.  
43. This inference flows in part from the cases discussed by Justice Souter, which refer 
to violations that are ―heinous actions‖ that violate universal norms and that are ―actionable.‖ 
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732. 
44. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 22, at 512–15; Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy 
in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT‘L L. 291 (2006); Jarvis, supra note 24, at 693 
(discussing jus cogens norms). 
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ATS. It rejected arguments advanced by the plaintiff in Sosa, which 
are echoed by arguments again raised in Kiobel, that the ATS is 
substantive law creating new grounds for claims. In doing so, the 
Court held that the ATS is purely jurisdictional in nature, giving the 
district courts ―cognizance‖ of certain causes of action for violations 
of international law, rather than providing authority for the creation 
of new causes of action, or itself providing a statutory cause of 
action.
45
 In other words, the ATS confers upon the district courts 
jurisdiction to adjudicate, and provide a civil remedy for, violations 
of a narrow range of customary international law principles that give 
rise to individual liability. It does so only through the incorporation 
by reference of the law of nations, rather than through any attempt to 
implement those principles within domestic law.  
This point can be better understood by contrasting the ATS with 
the much more recent Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA).
46
 The 
TVPA creates a cause of action for damages in domestic law against 
―[a]n individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of 
law, of any foreign nation,‖ subjects an individual to torture and 
extrajudicial killing, among other things.
47
 Rather than merely 
referring to the definition of torture in the Convention Against 
Torture, the TVPA provides its own definition, which is drawn 
directly from the convention. In so doing it makes the definition, and 
the cause of action, an integral part of U.S. domestic law. The TVPA 
is an example of the implementation through statute of certain 
international law principles, in contrast to the ATS, which is an 
example of the incorporation by reference of certain international 
law principles.
48
 This results in significant differences in how the two 
statutes operate, and in whether they should be understood as 
constituting an exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction in addition to 
authorizing the exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction. 
The legislation that implements international law principles will 
evolve over time within the domestic legal system, independent of 
how those principles may develop in the international system. In 
contrast, the incorporation by reference of international law norms, 
with the grant of jurisdiction to courts to directly adjudicate the 
 
45. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713. 
46. Pub. L. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006)). 
47. Id.  
48. See Ekaterina Apostolova, The Relationship Between the Alien Tort Statute and the 
Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 BERKELEY J. INT‘L L. 640 (2010) (comparing the ATS and 
the TVPA). 
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violations of those principles, will be much less likely to lead to such 
divergence over time.
49
 When courts are called upon to adjudicate 
cases concerning those principles, they will be required to consider 
how the principles have evolved and been interpreted within 
international law, in a way that they would not be required to do 
when the principles are directly implemented through statute. Thus, 
the ATS, which the Court in Sosa recognized as merely incorporating 
by reference ―the law of nations,‖50 will continue to confer 
jurisdiction to adjudicate violations of a class of customary 
international law principles, as that class has developed and evolved 
over time. In doing so, courts will naturally apply the then-current 
interpretations of those international law principles.
51
 
The U.S. federal courts will of course be exercising adjudicative 
jurisdiction in cases arising under both the ATS and the TVPA. But 
flowing from the difference between the statutes explained above, we 
should understand that under the TVPA the courts will be applying 
U.S. law to foreign conduct. This application of the law will reflect 
an exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction in respect of conduct abroad. 
In contrast, in the case of the ATS, the courts will be adjudicating, 
and fashioning a civil remedy for, violations of international law 
itself. While the remedy is a creation of U.S. law, the substance of the 
law being adjudicated and enforced is not—the substantive law 
remains the relevant principles of international law.  
It will be argued by some that even if this is true, the statutory 
fashioning of the remedy, and indeed the rather unique imposition of 
 
49. See Craig Martin, Taking War Seriously: A Model for Constitutional Constraints on 
the Use of Force in Compliance with International Law, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 611, 709–11 
(2011) (discussing the difference between implementation and incorporation of international 
law into domestic law in the context of internalizing norms on the use of force). 
50. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 721.  
51. On this point I should clarify a position I have taken in the past. In Taking War 
Seriously, in the process of discussing the ATS in the context of comparing methods and 
ramifications of domestic incorporation and implementation of international law, I wrote that 
the ATS did not ―incorporate the international law norms per se, but as the Supreme Court 
held in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the statute confers subject matter jurisdiction and creates a 
cause of action for the violation of the ‗law of nations,‘ which is a reference to customary 
international law.‖ Martin, supra note 49, at 710. Upon reflection, this was too fine a 
distinction. By incorporating the ―law of nations‖ by reference, and given that the ―law of 
nations‖ has been interpreted to mean a narrow range of customary international law 
principles, it is fair to say that the ATS does incorporate by reference that subset of 
customary international law principles.   
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a civil remedy in tort for violations of international law norms that 
are for the most part criminal in nature, is an exercise of prescriptive 
jurisdiction—and that this by itself is an impermissible interference 
in the sovereignty of other states. There are, however, two responses 
to this argument. First, under the concept of universal jurisdiction the 
state that has personal jurisdiction over the perpetrator of the crime in 
question has some discretion in terms of developing and applying a 
sanction.
52
 Second, this domestic development of a sanction for a 
violation of a foreign or international law is entirely consistent with 
private international law principles: choice of law and law of the 
forum may operate such that the law of one jurisdiction provides for 
the prohibition and the basis for liability, while the law of the forum 
provides the remedy. In other words, as applied to the circumstances 
of the ATS, international law provides for the ―conduct regulating‖ 
rule, while the law of the forum provides the ―loss-allocating‖ rule.53 
III. EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN THE ―GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR‖ 
The foregoing analysis suggests that there is good reason to 
believe that the ATS is not an extraterritorial exercise of prescriptive 
jurisdiction, inconsistent with international law principles, even when 
applied in foreign-cubed cases. This raises the question of why the 
Kiobel Court professed such concern over the possibility, particularly 
when that was not the issue presented to the Court. In considering 
why the Court might have raised the issue, a natural line of inquiry is 
to examine how the Court, and federal courts generally, have dealt 
with issues of extraterritoriality in other contexts. Have the courts 
been as concerned with the possible extraterritorial application of 
other laws? Much has been written on the extraterritorial reach of 
U.S. law and how the federal courts have treated such 
extraterritoriality.
54
 The extent to which the United States 
 
52. CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 467–68. 
53. Anthony J. Colangelo, The ATS and Extraterritoriality, Part II: Universal Civil 
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, OPINIO JURIS (Mar. 27, 2012, 10:30 AM), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2012/03/27/universal-civil-jurisdiction-and-choice-of-law;         see Anthony 
J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1086 (2011); 
see also Hannah Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J. INT‘L L. 251, 255, 
268, 298 (2006). 
54. See Developments in the Law: Extraterritoriality, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1226 (2011); 
see also Dan E. Stigall, International Law and Limitations on the Exercise of Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction in U.S. Domestic Law, 35 HASTINGS INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 323 (2012); 
Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality and Conflicts of Jurisdiction, 77 AM. SOC‘Y INT‘L L. 
PROC. 370 (1983); William S. Dodge, The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality After 
Morrison, 105 AM. SOC‘Y INT‘L L. PROC. 396 (2011); Michelle K. Fiechter, Extraterritorial 
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increasingly sought to apply its antitrust law extraterritorially in the 
latter half of the twentieth century, for instance, is notorious.
55
 But 
less studied, and more directly relevant for assessing the Court‘s 
stance in Kiobel, is how the courts have treated the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law in cases relating to the so-called ―global war 
on terror,‖ in which many of the issues in play, such as arbitrary 
detention, interrogation and torture, and extrajudicial killing, are 
similar to those that were raised in Kiobel, and are at the center of 
many ATS claims. How have the courts considered extraterritoriality 
in these cases? 
There is a growing and complex jurisprudence relating to the 
GWOT, and a similarly robust scholarly analysis of the 
jurisprudence.
56
 This short Article cannot review the entire landscape. 
But it examines a few examples, in order to explore the extent to 
 
Application of the Alien Tort Statute: The Effect of Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd. 
on Future Litigation, 97 IOWA L. REV. 959 (2012); Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction 
Over International Law Claims: Inquiries Into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & 
POL. 1 (1986); Jordan J. Paust, Kiobel, Corporate Liability, and the Extraterritorial Reach of 
the ATS, 53 VA. J. INT‘L L. 18 (2012). 
55. It was precisely in this area that the courts developed the ―effects doctrine‖ (the 
―objective territorial principle‖) to justify the extension of U.S. jurisdiction to govern 
conduct abroad that would allegedly impact U.S. markets. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. 
& S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). In doing so, they searched for implicit Congressionial 
intent to apply antitrust law abroad to mitigate such effects, all in order to overcome the 
presumption against extraterritoriality and the strictures of the Charming Betsy doctrine. The 
effects doctrine was explicitly adopted by Congress for application in the realm of antitrust 
in the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006). See generally 
Richard W. Beckler & Matthew H. Kirtland, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust 
Law: What is a “Direct, Substantial, and Reasonably Foreseeable Effect” Under the 
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act?, 38 TEX. INT‘L L.J. 11 (2003); William S. 
Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial 
Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 101 (1998); Joseph P. Griffin, Extraterritoriality in U.S. 
and EU Antitrust Enforcement, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 159 (1999); Salil K. Mehra, 
Extraterritorial Antitrust Enforcement and the Myth of International Consensus, 10 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT‘L L. 191 (1999); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Review Essay: Extraterritoriality, 
Conflict of Laws, and the Regulation of Transnational Business, 25 TEX. INT‘L L.J. 71 
(1990). 
56. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 
557 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
See generally Julian G. Ku, The Third Wave: The Alien Tort Statute and the War on 
Terrorism, 19 EMORY INT‘L. L. REV. 105 (2005); Jules Lobel, The Supreme Court and Enemy 
Combatants, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1131 (2008); Thomas M. Pohl, From Blackbeard to Bin 
Laden: The Re-Emergence of the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789 and Its Potential Impact on 
the Global War on Terrorism, 34 J. LEGIS. 77 (2008). 
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which they reveal whether the claims made in those cases were in 
response to government conduct that constituted the extraterritorial 
exercise of U.S. prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction, potentially 
violating international law principles on jurisdiction, and without 
explicit congressionial intent—and how the courts have treated such 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law. 
A. Extraterritorial Application of Rights – A Misdirected Focus 
The majority of cases arising from the GWOT relate to the 
detention of foreigners in Guantánamo Bay in Cuba, Bagram Air 
Force Base in Afghanistan, and elsewhere. In those cases, and in the 
academic literature about this line of cases, there has been extensive 
discussion of extraterritoriality—but it relates specifically and 
narrowly to the question of whether certain rights under U.S. law 
operate extraterritorially and so protect these detainees.
57
 This focus 
overlooks entirely the extraterritorial application of U.S. law that has 
given rise to the claims for such rights and protection. Before turning 
to that other aspect of these cases, however, it is worth making some 
observations about this judicial and scholarly analysis of the 
extension of rights. The high-water mark of extraterritorial 
application of rights came in Boumediene v. Bush,
58
 in which the 
Court held that the constitutional right to the writ of habeas corpus
59
 
did indeed extend to foreigners being detained in the leased territory 
in Guantánamo Bay, and it struck down as unconstitutional the 
provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA),
60
 which 
purported to exclude the application of the suspension clause to such 
detainees.
61
 In this sense, Boumediene is viewed as a victory for 
rights-protection generally, an expansion of extraterritorial 
application of constitutional rights in particular, and a check on the 
 
57. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 54, at 1126, 1158; Apostolova, supra 
note 48; Jamie A. Baron Rodriguez, Torture on Trial: How the Alien Tort Statute May 
Expose the United States Government‟s Illegal „Extraordinary Rendition‟ Program Through 
Its Use of a Private Contractor, 14 ILSA J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 189 (2007); Ku, supra note 56; 
Pohl, supra note 56. 
58. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
59. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2. 
60. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 109 Pub. L. 366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C. (2006)). 
61. For a discussion of the constitutional problems associated with such jurisdiction 
stripping, see Alex Glashausser, The Extension Clause and the Supreme Court‟s 
Jurisdictional Independence, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1225 (2012); Martin J. Katz, Guantánamo, 
Boumediene, and Jurisdiction-Stripping: The Imperial President Meets the Imperial Court, 
25 CONST. COMMENT. 377 (2009). 
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expanding power of the Executive in the GWOT.
62
  
This holding in Boumediene, however, has been very narrowly 
construed by the lower courts in subsequent cases, and the Court has 
chosen not to grant certiorari in any of these cases. For example, the 
D.C. Circuit purported to apply the Boumediene standard in Al 
Maqaleh v. Gates,
63
 holding that the writ of habeas corpus did not 
extend to persons detained at Bagram.
64
 The primary distinguishing 
features, according to the court, were that the United States did not 
exercise the kind of de facto sovereign control over Bagram that it 
did over Guantánamo Bay
65
 (a feature that had been emphasized by 
Justice Kennedy in Boumediene
66
), and that Bagram was located in a 
theatre of war, thus creating practical obstacles to extending 
constitutional rights to detainees there.
67
 So, notwithstanding 
Boumediene, the extraterritorial application of rights under U.S. law, 
including constitutional rights, to those who are arguably under the 
complete jurisdiction and control of the U.S. government, has 
actually been very limited.
68
 
 
62. For analysis of Boumediene, see, e.g., Ryan Firestone, The Boumediene Illusion: The 
Unsettled Role of Habeas Corpus Abroad in the War on Terror, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 555 
(2012); Jonathan Hafetz, Calling the Government to Account: Habeas Corpus in the 
Aftermath of Boumediene, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 99 (2011); Walter E. Kuhn, The Terrorist 
Detention Review Reform Act: Detention Policy and Political Reality, 35 SETON HALL LEGIS. 
J. 221 (2011); Lobel, supra note 56; Nathaniel H. Nesbitt, Meeting Boumediene‟s Challenge: 
The Emergence of an Effective Habeas Jurisprudence and Obsolescence of New Detention 
Legislation, 95 MINN. L. REV. 244 (2010).  
63. 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
64. Id. at 98.  
65. Id. at 97.  
66. 553 U.S. 723, 755 (2008). 
67. Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 97.   
68. See, e.g., JENNIFER K. ELSEA & MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R41156, JUDICIAL ACTIVITY CONCERNING ENEMY COMBATANT DETAINEES: MAJOR COURT 
RULINGS (2012) (reviewing detention cases); see also N.Y. STATE BAR ASS‘N COMM. ON 
CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT ON EXECUTIVE DETENTION, HABEAS CORPUS AND THE MILITARY 
COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006 (2008); Lobel, supra note 56; Joshua Geltzer, Decisions 
Detained: The Courts‟ Embrace of Complexity in Guantánamo-Related Litigation, 29 
BERKLEY J. INT‘L L. 94 (2011); Alexandra Link, Trying Terrorism: Joint Criminal 
Enterprise, Material Support, and the Paradox of International Criminal Law, 34 MICH. J. 
INT‘L L. 439 (2013). Parenthetically, this very limited extension of rights to persons under 
U.S. control can be contrasted with how the European Court of Human Rights has analyzed 
the extension of rights under the European Convention of Human Rights to detainees and 
others killed by the armed forces of member states. See, e.g., Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 
App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 589 (2011). 
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The focus in U.S. legal discourse on the extent and validity of 
the extraterritorial application of rights in the context of the GWOT 
may highlight the significant limits placed on the protections 
available to detainees and others subject to U.S. jurisdiction. But it 
tends to obscure the extent to which U.S. law is being applied 
extraterritorially in a manner that violates the principles of 
international law on jurisdiction. Indeed, the exclusive focus on the 
extension of rights in the context of discussing extraterritoriality may 
be viewed as being somewhat bizarre, particularly in light of the 
arguments made in Kiobel, for two reasons. First, the extension of 
constitutional rights for the purpose of providing protections to 
foreigners located in the territory of another state, in their relationship 
with the government of the United States, is not the kind of 
extraterritorial application of law that is likely to offend the 
sovereignty of that other state.
69
 It is not an exercise of jurisdiction in 
which U.S. law prescribes, limits, or otherwise governs the conduct 
of a foreign national in foreign territory. Rather, it only provides 
protections to a foreigner in his or her interaction with the U.S. 
government, in a manner that tends to be of little relevance to the 
laws of the territory in which the person happens to be located.
70
  
Second, and more important, this preoccupation with whether 
U.S. legal rights can apply extraterritorially to protect foreign 
plaintiffs entirely fails to question whether the government conduct 
against which those plaintiffs seek protection is itself an 
impermissible extraterritorial application of U.S. law. The judicial 
and academic focus on rights, while ignoring the government‘s 
actions giving rise to those rights claims, seems almost paradoxical. 
Because upon some reflection, it would appear that the laws and 
policies that are the cause of the rights claims in these GWOT cases 
constitute a much more problematic exercise of either prescriptive or 
enforcement jurisdiction within the territory of another state than any 
extension of rights would be, and they are arguably in violation of the 
international law principles on jurisdiction.
71
 It is to that 
 
69. See generally Zachary D. Clopton, Replacing the Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality, B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013); Chimène I. Keitner, Rights Beyond 
Borders, 36 YALE J. INT‘L L. 55 (2011); Stigall, supra note 54. 
70. However, courts have argued that extending rights could interfere with the foreign 
relations of the United States with the government of Afghanistan. See, e.g., Al-Zahrani v. 
Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103, 112 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
71. As explained, the primary argument is that these laws do constitute an exercise of 
jurisdiction, arguably in violation of international law principles and the domestic 
presumptions. The first implication of this is that U.S. jurisdiction should not be so applied. 
But alternatively, these observations should also bolster the argument that the Constitution 
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extraterritorial application of U.S. law that I now turn. 
B. Indefinite Detention 
To explore this second point in more detail, I begin by 
considering the circumstances surrounding the early detention cases. 
It will be recalled that from the beginning of 2002, shortly after the 
invasion of Afghanistan, the United States began transporting 
suspected members of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other persons 
suspected of being or supporting terrorists, to a detention facility at 
Guantánamo Bay. Rising to over 700 persons, these detainees were 
specifically not afforded the status of prisoners of war under the 
Geneva Conventions, nor were they charged with any criminal 
offense.
72
 The detainees were said to be detained pursuant to the 
authority of the AUMF,
73
 which was a joint resolution of Congress 
authorizing the President to:  
[U]se all necessary and appropriate force against those 
nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist 
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or 
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to 
prevent any future acts of international terrorism 
against the United States by such nations, 
organizations or persons.
74
 
In addition, authority flowed from the Presidential Military Order of 
November 13, 2001, titled ―Detention, Treatment, and Trial of 
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism‖ (Presidential 
MO).
75
  
The majority of the detainees in Guantánamo had been captured 
 
ought to follow the flag. Those who will defend the legitimacy of these extraterritorial 
applications of U.S. law should have a difficult time also maintaining, on a principled basis, 
that rights should not also be extended to those affected by such laws. 
72. Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain 
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,831, 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001); 
see also COMM. ON MILITARY AFFAIRS & JUSTICE OF THE ASS‘N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF 
NEW YORK, INTER ARMA SILENT LEGES: IN TIMES OF ARMED CONFLICT, SHOULD THE LAWS BE 
SILENT? (2001), available at http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/should_the_laws.pdf. 
73. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)). 
74. Id. § 2(a). 
75. See supra note 72. 
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in Afghanistan, which was a theater of war in the international armed 
conflict in which the United States was a belligerent (the international 
armed conflict became a non-international armed conflict in 2002, 
but the United States remained a belligerent assisting the government 
against an insurgency). Many, however, had been detained in other 
countries in which there was no armed conflict. They were, 
moreover, nationals of countries not involved in the conflict in 
Afghanistan. Many of them also argued that they had no affiliation 
with either al-Qaeda or the Taliban. A plurality of the Supreme Court 
had held in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
76
 the first in the line of Supreme 
Court detention cases, that the government‘s authority to detain 
persons captured fighting in Afghanistan was a necessary incident to 
the authority conferred by the AUMF,
77
 but that left open the 
question of whether the AUMF could provide authority to detain 
those persons captured elsewhere. 
Several of these detainees challenged in the federal courts the 
validity of their detention, and some of them grounded their claims in 
part under the ATS itself. The issue reached the Supreme Court in the 
amalgamated case of Rasul v. Bush,
78
 the second in the line of 
detention cases decided by the Supreme Court, handed down in 2004. 
The petitioners were Australian and Kuwaiti nationals.
79
 One of the 
Australians, Mamdouh Habib, was a dual Egyptian and Australian 
national, who had been captured in Pakistan, was held and 
interrogated there by the CIA, and then ―rendered‖ to Egypt, where 
he was again interrogated and allegedly tortured for five months, 
after which he was transferred to Guantánamo.
80
  
The primary issue before the Court in Rasul was whether federal 
 
76. 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (―We conclude that detention of individuals falling into the 
limited category we are considering, for the duration of the particular conflict in which they 
were captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the 
‗necessary and appropriate force‘ Congress has authorized the President to use.‖). 
77. Id. at 517. Hamdi was also a U.S. citizen, and much of the case turned on the 
question of the authority to detain an American determined to be an ―enemy combatant.‖ Id. 
at 509. 
78. 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
79. Id. at 470.  
80. For a compilation of court documents relating to Habib‘s litigation, see Declaration 
of Teresa A. McPalmer, Habib v. Bush, No. 02-CV-1130 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2004), available at 
http://humanrights.ucdavis.edu/projects/the-guantanamo-testimonials-project/testimonies/test 
imonies-of-the-defense-department/csrts/csrt_isn_661.pdf. For accounts of his ordeal, see 
Profile: Hamdouh Habib, BBCNEWS (Dec. 7, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/4214747.stm; JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON 
TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS 125–26 (2008). 
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courts had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to hear the habeas 
corpus claims of such detainees.
81
 Or, to put it another way, whether 
the statutory right to habeas corpus had extraterritorial application to 
persons detained at Guantánamo Bay. The government argued that 
the statutory right to habeas corpus could not be extended to 
Guantánamo precisely because it would constitute an impermissible 
extraterritorial application of law, in violation of the presumption 
against extraterritoriality in U.S. law.
82
 The majority held that the 
presumption could not apply to the operation of the habeas statute 
with respect to persons detained in Guantánamo, because of the 
extent to which the United States exercised jurisdiction over 
Guantánamo Bay and the government agents implementing the 
detention.
83
 Thus, in essence, the application of the statute at 
Guantánamo would not be extraterritorial at all. Having found that 
the federal courts had jurisdiction for that purpose, the majority 
proceeded to find that the courts also had jurisdiction to hear ATS 
claims, which the lower courts had denied on the grounds that the 
detainees lacked ―litigation privilege‖ in the United States.84 
This account of the case thus far is typical of the discussion 
regarding the extent to which habeas corpus and constitutional rights 
should be applied extraterritorially. In that sense it was a victory for 
the detainees. But let us pause to consider the extraterritorial 
operation of U.S. law that deprived these applicants of their freedom. 
Individuals who were citizens of countries on friendly terms with the 
United States were seized and detained in countries that were not 
engaged in any armed conflict and in which the United States was 
certainly not a belligerent, on the direction of U.S. agents. The 
captured individuals were then subjected to interrogation by agents of 
the U.S. government (and other governments, in cooperation with 
U.S. agents) and indefinitely detained without charge by the U.S. 
government.
85
 Leaving aside the extent to which these actions were 
 
81. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475.  
82. Id. at 480. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 484. 
85. It should be noted that one of the petitioners in Rasul was David Hicks, the 
Australian who was ultimately charged and later convicted under a plea agreement for 
providing material support to terrorists in the Military Commissions in Guantánamo. He 
remains one of only a handful of persons charged and convicted under the military 
commissions system. Mamdouh Habib was released in 2005. 
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violations of U.S. obligations under international law in other 
respects (namely, under international human rights law and the 
international law of diplomatic relations), they were arguably 
extraterritorial applications of U.S. law in apparent violation of the 
principles of jurisdiction under international law.
86
  
The seizure, interrogation, and detention constituted an exercise 
of U.S. jurisdiction that began in foreign territory and in respect of 
foreign nationals, for alleged conduct that had occurred in foreign 
territory. The Supreme Court in Rasul partially grounded its decision 
regarding jurisdiction on the fact that the detainees were currently in 
a territory that was effectively under U.S. jurisdiction, and on the 
basis that the U.S. agents implementing such detention were certainly 
under the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
87
 That was so for purposes 
of the operation of the habeas statute and the ATS. But left 
unexamined is the fact that the circumstances leading to the detention 
of these foreigners reflected an extraterritorial application of U.S. law 
and that the continued detention of foreigners for alleged conduct in 
third countries constituted an ongoing extraterritorial exercise of 
jurisdiction. These actions were not only the exercise of prescriptive 
jurisdiction, but, more importantly, of enforcement jurisdiction. 
Enforcement jurisdiction is treated with the most suspicion under 
international law because it is most likely to offend the sovereignty of 
other states when exercised extraterritorially.
88
  
I discuss below whether such exercise of jurisdiction may be 
justified under one of the exceptions to the international law 
prohibitions against extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction, and 
whether these detentions were undertaken pursuant to explicit and 
intentional congressionial direction so as to defeat the domestic 
presumptions. But I will argue that it cannot be so justified, and if 
that is right, then this was a violation of both the international law 
principles and the domestic presumptions that the Court was so 
concerned about in Kiobel. While I will examine these issues in more 
detail below, I pause here to consider some aspects relating to the 
apparent legal authority for these detentions, which should be a 
fundamental line of inquiry in any habeas litigation. As noted above, 
the Supreme Court held in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
89
 that the government 
 
86. Whether such conduct falls within the scope of the exceptions discussed earlier, will 
be addressed in Part IV.B. 
87. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478–79. 
88. CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 478–82. 
89. 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
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is authorized under the AUMF to detain persons captured while 
fighting U.S. forces in Afghanistan.
90
 But a significant number of 
detainees being held in Guantánamo and elsewhere were not captured 
in Afghanistan, are not members of al-Qaeda, and so do not readily 
fit within the scope of the AUMF. Thus, the legal authority for their 
detention is not clear, which should trigger questions of 
extraterritoriality under the domestic presumptions. 
Consider the case of Al Maqaleh v. Gates,
91
 in which habeas 
claims were brought by three individuals who were being detained at 
Bagram.
92
 One was a Yemeni citizen who was originally captured in 
Thailand, another was a Tunisian who was captured in Pakistan, and 
the third was a Yemeni citizen whose place of capture was disputed.
93
 
All three were citizens of countries with which the United States was 
not in armed conflict, and two alleged that they were captured in 
countries that were not theaters of armed conflict.
94
 Their detention in 
Afghanistan had no relation to the armed conflict in Afghanistan,
95
 
and they were initially detained at sites in other countries, the 
location of which has not been disclosed.
96
 It is not clear, nor did the 
D.C. Circuit engage in any detailed analysis to clarify, how these 
individuals came within the scope of the language of the AUMF, 
which only authorized the use of force against those organizations or 
persons who had been responsible for the 9/11 attacks and those who 
had harbored such persons after the fact.
97
  
Moreover, the process by which the detainees were determined 
to come within the scope of the detention power was itself highly 
suspect. Their status as ―enemy combatants‖ was established in a 
process conducted before an ―Unlawful Enemy Combatant Review 
Board‖ (UECRB).98 The district court and D.C. Circuit both held that 
the UECRB afforded detainees with even fewer procedural rights 
 
90. Id. at 518.  
91. 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
92. Id. at 88.  
93. Id. at 87. 
94. Joint Brief for Petitioners-Appellees at 2–3, Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d 84 (Nos. 09-5265, 
09-5266, 09-5277).  
95. Id. at 1–2.  
96. Id. at 2–3. 
97. Authorization for Use of Military Force, § 2, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 
(2001) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)). 
98. Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 96. 
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than the Combat Status Review Tribunals (CSRT) that were 
established after the decision in Rasul v. Bush.
99
 Consequently, 
because of the irregularity of the process by which status was 
determined, the D.C. Circuit held that ―while the important adequacy 
of process factor [in the Boumediene test] strongly supported the 
extension of the Suspension Clause and habeas rights in Boumediene, 
it even more strongly favors petitioners here.‖100 Nonetheless, the 
court denied the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds that the 
United States did not exercise de facto sovereignty over Bagram, and 
it was, in any event, in a theater of war.
101
  
What is significant, however, is the absence of any apparent 
inquiry into the justification for the extraterritorial exercise of U.S. 
jurisdiction. The determination of the detainees‘ status as ―unlawful 
enemy combatants‖ was through the application of a U.S. legal 
framework within the territory of Afghanistan. The UECRB was not 
established pursuant to any federal legislation, and indeed the precise 
policy and procedure of the UECRB was extremely unclear at the 
time.
102
 Whether these individuals could be legitimately detained 
under the putative authority of the AUMF, therefore, remains a 
highly debatable point.  
Nonetheless, the detention constituted an exercise of prescriptive 
jurisdiction, and one much more likely to conflict with the laws and 
sovereign rights of Afghanistan than any extension of U.S. legal 
rights could. Indeed, significant friction between the United States 
and Afghanistan over U.S. detentions at Bagram and elsewhere has 
continued up to the time of this writing.
103
 What is more, the resulting 
detention of these individuals within Afghanistan reflects not only an 
exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction, but also enforcement jurisdiction 
within the territory of another sovereign state, against which the 
international law principles on jurisdiction are the most restrictive. As 
 
99. 542 U.S. 466 (2008). 
100. Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 96. 
101. Id. at 97. 
102. See Memorandum from Deputy Sec‘y of Def. for Sec‘ys of the Military Dep‘ts, 
Policy Guidance on Review Procedures and Transfer and Release Auth. at Bagram Theater 
Internment Facility, Afg. (July 2, 2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs 
/natsec/bagram20100514/07bagrampolicy_30-92.pdf; Reply to Petitioner‘s Opposition to 
Respondents‘ Motion to Dismiss, Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d 84 (Nos. 09-5265, 09-5266, 09-
5267).   
103. See, e.g., Rod Nordland, Karzai Orders Afghan Forces to Take Control of American-
Built Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2013, at A4; Rod Nordland, U.S. Cancels Transfer of 
Bagram Prison to Afghans, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 
03/09/world/asia/us-cancels-transfer-of-bagram-prison-to-afghans.html?r=0. 
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will be discussed below, this exercise of jurisdiction arguably did not 
fall within the exceptions on the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction, 
nor was it a direct application of the law of armed conflict.
104
 There is 
no exploration in the court‘s judgment of whether this exercise of 
jurisdiction met the international law exceptions, no inquiry into the 
precise legal authority for it, and whether such authority reflected 
explicit congressionial intent to violate international law. Yet, while 
preoccupied with the question of whether the rights of habeas corpus 
could extend extraterritorially to apply to detainees in Bagram, the 
D.C. Circuit never even considered the question of whether the 
application of U.S. law in detaining those individuals in Bagram was 
itself a permissible extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction. The courts 
are untroubled by the question: if habeas rights cannot be extended, 
how can the laws that are depriving the habeas applicant of his liberty 
be so extended? And if the extraterritorial application of law 
depriving him of his liberty is legitimate, how can it be that the 
related habeas rights do not equally so apply? 
C. Torture and U.S. Defendants 
In addition to the burgeoning number of detention and habeas 
claims arising from the GWOT, there are a disturbing number of 
cases that involve allegations of torture conducted by agents of the 
U.S. government, or in some cases by foreign agents at the behest of 
the U.S. government. Several of these cases included claims 
advanced under the ATS. The manner in which the courts have dealt 
with these cases is relevant to my discussion here for a number of 
reasons.  
First, torture was one of the claims advanced in Kiobel,
105
 and 
there can be no question that the prohibition against torture is, 
pursuant to the Sosa standard, one of the jus cogens norms that falls 
within the narrow range of principles that can ground an ATS claim. 
The claim in Filártiga, it will be recalled, was based on a violation of 
the prohibition against torture.
106
 Like piracy, torture is one of those 
international wrongs over which all countries have jurisdiction to 
adjudicate and provide remedies. Indeed, the Convention Against 
Torture not only authorizes the exercise of universal jurisdiction, but 
 
104. See infra Part IV.B. 
105. 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013).  
106. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 877 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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it imposes obligations on states to prosecute or extradite those 
accused of torture.
 107
 
Second, it is particularly instructive to examine how the courts 
have considered torture claims advanced under the ATS where the 
defendants are U.S. nationals. One of the arguments against ATS 
claims in foreign-cubed cases is that they are impermissible precisely 
because there is no essential connection to the United States.
108
 Such 
arguments suggest that while it might make sense for U.S. courts to 
adjudicate the claims of foreigners when the defendant is a U.S. 
national, or there is some other substantial connection to the United 
States, it is not reasonable for them to do so when both parties are 
foreigners and the offending conduct occurred abroad.
109
 These 
arguments make frequent reference to the original incidents that are 
said to have motivated the enactment of the ATS, such as attacks on 
foreign ambassadors within the territory of the United States. The 
clear implication is that ATS claims by foreigners against U.S. 
defendants, for the violation of jus cogens norms (or other principles 
of customary international law falling within the Sosa standard), 
would be valid (subject to other defenses) and indeed fulfill the 
original intent of the statute.  
The reality reflected by the torture cases arising from the 
GWOT, however, suggests that such arguments are hollow. While 
they are raised against the adjudication of foreign-cubed ATS cases, 
they are nowhere to be found when a U.S. defendant is actually 
before a court. For instance, in Rasul v. Myers,
110
 the D.C. Circuit 
considered the claims of four British detainees against then Secretary 
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and others for having unlawfully 
detained the petitioners at Guantánamo Bay, and for the torture that 
 
107. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment arts. 4–8, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.  
108. This was, indeed, one of the central arguments of Justice Breyer in his concurrence in 
Kiobel. See 133 S. Ct. at 1677–78 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).  
109. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Reargument, supra note 9, at 45 (oral argument of 
Solicitor General Donald Verrilli); Brief of the Governments of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Neither Party, supra note 39, at 15. 
110. 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008), vacated, 555 U.S. 1083 (2008). The case, often 
referred to as Rasul I, is complicated by the fact that the decision was vacated and remanded 
by the Supreme Court on the basis that the decision in Boumediene cast aspects of it in 
doubt. But in Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1091 
(2009), often referred to as Rasul II, the D.C. Circuit reinstated its decision in Rasul I, and 
the Supreme Court denied the application for certiorari. So ultimately, the decision in Rasul I 
on the ATS stands, and the Supreme Court denied certriorari on that issue. 
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they alleged they had suffered while detained. They advanced these 
claims on a number of grounds, including the Fifth and Eighth 
Amendments of the Constitution, the ATS, and certain provisions of 
the Geneva Conventions.
111
  
The D.C. Circuit dismissed the claims in part based on 
arguments that the constitutional rights in question did not extend 
extraterritorially to detainees in Guantánamo Bay—once again 
focusing on the limited reach of the Constitution.
112
 But the court also 
dismissed the ATS claims of the petitioners, holding that the 
―detention and interrogation of suspected enemy combatants‖ by the 
defendants was ―incidental to [their] legitimate employment 
duties.‖113 Therefore, because the defendants ―had acted within the 
scope of their employment‖ the ATS claims were ―restyled‖ as 
claims against the United States governed by the Federal Tort Claims 
Act (FTCA),
114
 and the court then dismissed those claims for failure 
to exhaust administrative remedies as the FTCA requires.
115
 The 
FTCA allows suits against the government for personal injury or 
death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of an 
employee of the government while acting in the scope of his office or 
employment.
116
 It also, however, bars such claims where the wrong 
occurred in a foreign country.
117
 Moreover, the FTCA was amended 
by the Westfall Act,
118
 such that where the government employee 
was acting within the scope of his office or employment, the suit can 
only be brought against the government, and not against any 
individual.
119
 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in respect to these 
ATS claims in Rasul v. Myers,
120
 apparently seeing no reason to 
disturb this rejection of ATS claims against U.S. defendants for 
torture.  
Two years later, in Ali v. Rumsfeld,
121
 the D.C. Circuit 
 
111. Rasul I, 512 F.3d at 649. 
112. Id. at 664–65 . 
113. Id. at 658–59. 
114. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006). 
115. Rasul I, 512 F.3d at 660–61. 
116. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). 
117. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2006). 
118. 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (2006). 
119. Id. § 2679(b)(1). 
120. 555 U.S. 1083 (2008). For details of the case history, see supra note 110.  
121. 649 F.3d 762 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
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considered the claims of a number of individuals who had been 
detained in Afghanistan and Iraq. The plaintiffs alleged, among other 
things, that they had suffered abuse that would qualify as torture and 
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, in violation of international 
law.
122
 The claims were made against government agents, again 
including former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. Relying on its 
holding in Rasul v. Myers, the court again found that the defendants 
had been acting within the scope of their employment in engaging in 
the alleged torture
123—and again found that the Westfall Act applied, 
such that the claims had to be properly brought against the United 
States rather than the individual defendants.
124
 As such, 
administrative remedies had to have been exhausted, and as they 
were not, the claims were dismissed.
125
 Interestingly, the Westfall 
Act does not immunize federal employees in circumstances in which 
the tort involves the violation of a federal statute, and in Ali v. 
Rumsfeld petitioners argued that the defendants had violated the ATS 
itself, and thus could not come within the scope of the Westfall Act. 
The court, in rejecting this argument, reaffirmed its understanding of 
Sosa, in that the ATS was a strictly jurisdictional statute, and that it 
created no substantive cause of action. The violations of law that the 
petitioners alleged constituted violations of customary international 
law, which the ATS empowered the federal courts to adjudicate, but 
did not constitute violations of the ATS itself.
126
  
There are, of course, a number of other cases involving claims 
for remedies to address injury caused by torture perpetrated either by 
agents of the U.S. government, or those of other states acting in 
cooperation with the U.S. government. And there is also now a 
significant degree of evidence that the U.S. government under the 
Bush administration engaged in systematic torture, approved at the 
 
122. Id. at 765. 
123. The torture claims were, of course, assumed to be true for the purposes of the motion. 
Id. at 769. 
124. Id. at 775. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 775–76. The D.C. Circuit‘s interpretation of Sosa, and of the ATS as a purely 
jurisdictional grant to adjudicate violations of international law, was of course consistent 
with the position that I have taken here on the operation of the ATS. But it is not at all clear 
that such an interpretation necessitates the holding that the ATS cannot thereby be violated 
within the meaning of the immunity exception in the Westfall Act. Judge Edwards, in a 
powerful dissent in Ali, argued that where a court determines for the purposes of an ATS 
claim that a state official has engaged in torture, in violation of a principle of international 
law that falls within the Sosa standard, such a violation constitutes a violation of the ATS for 
the purposes of triggering the exception in the Westfall Act. Id. at 778–93 (Edwards, J., 
dissenting). 
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highest levels of government.
127
 In Al-Zahrani v. Rodriguez,
128
 the 
families of detainees who were alleged to have died as a result of 
torture in Guantánamo Bay brought claims against a number of 
individual defendants, including the Director of the Joint Intelligence 
Group, under the ATS and other grounds.
129
 On appeal, the D.C. 
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims, holding that the court 
lacked jurisdiction to consider the issues because of the jurisdiction 
stripping provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 
(MCA).
130
 Yet while it was quite true that the Military Commissions 
Act had stripped jurisdiction to consider claims of ―an alien who is or 
was detained by the United States and has been determined by the 
United States to have been properly detained as an enemy 
combatant,‖131 there was no apparent inquiry into whether these 
deceased claimants had been ―determined by the United States to 
have been properly detained as an enemy combatant.‖ It has been 
well known for some time that many of the detainees held in 
Guantánamo Bay were not ―enemy combatants‖ as defined by the 
United States, and that the determination process that resulted in 
many being classified as ―enemy combatants‖ was deeply flawed.132  
Stepping back again to consider the underlying circumstances of 
these cases, there is at once an unmistakable asymmetry in how the 
court thinks about extraterritoriality, as well as a continued pattern of 
the rights claims being denied on technical doctrinal grounds. 
Moreover, the narrow technical reasoning in the denial of these 
claims stands in marked contrast to the broad and sweeping fashion 
in which the court establishes or accepts U.S. authority to detain and 
 
127. THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT‘S TASK FORCE 
ON DETAINEE TREATMENT 3–7 (2013), available at http://detaineetaskforce.org/pdf/Full-
Report.pdf. 
128. 669 F.3d 315 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
129. Id. at 316–17. 
130. Id. at 317; 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2) (2006) (―Except as provided in [§§ 1005(e)(2) and 
(e)(3) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005], no court, justice, or judge shall have 
jurisdiction to hear or consider any other action against the United States or its agents 
relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement 
of an alien who is or was detained by the United States and has been determined by the 
United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such 
determination.‖). 
131. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2).  
132. See, e.g., Mark Denbeaux & Joshua W. Denbeaux, No-Hearing Hearings: CSRT: 
The Modern Habeas Corpus? (Seton Hall Law Pub. Law & Legal Research Paper Series, 
2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=951245.   
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otherwise exercise jurisdiction over claimants. Thus, the D.C. Circuit 
in both decisions in Rasul v. Myers rejected the argument that 
substantive constitutional rights other than the narrow right to habeas 
corpus could be extended extraterritorially to benefit the detainees in 
Guantánamo Bay.
133
 The court held that Guantánamo Bay was 
foreign territory over which the United States did not have 
sovereignty for constitutional purposes.
134
 At the same time, it did not 
seem to consider at all the question of whether the conduct of the 
defendants, in detaining and interrogating these foreign individuals at 
Guantánamo Bay, was an extraterritorial exercise of prescriptive and 
enforcement jurisdiction in violation of the principles of jurisdiction 
in international law.  
Quite apart from the authority to detain, considered above, what 
was the authority of the agents to interrogate and indeed to torture 
these claimants? For the purpose of triggering the application of the 
Westfall Act and the FTCA, the court was prepared to assume that 
the American defendants were acting in the normal course of their 
duties as agents of the U.S. government, but did not consider whether 
their conduct was actually authorized by statute, and whether such 
legislation provided clear congressionial intent to apply 
extraterritorially, or indeed whether it conferred authority to detain 
and interrogate individuals of a class that included these specific 
claimants. As discussed above, the process by which detainees were 
determined to fall within the scope of the supposedly authorizing 
legislation—namely the CSRT and UECRB procedures—was itself 
only an administrative policy, and it was deeply flawed.
135
  
Then there are the contrasting ways in which the courts have 
considered the issue of ―nexus.‖ The concept of nexus has been 
important on the one hand to establish legal authority to detain 
persons captured beyond the battlefields of Afghanistan or Iraq, but 
on the other hand to deny the legal claims of such detainees. 
Beginning with the authority to detain, in a series of cases the D.C. 
Circuit has held that persons may be detained even if the nexus to al-
Qaeda or associated forces is highly attenuated, or even replaced by 
other criteria altogether.
136
 Such nexus may be established through a 
 
133. Rasul v. Myers (Rasul I), 512 F.3d 644, 666 (D.C. Cir. 2008), vacated, 555 U.S. 
1083 (2008); Rasul v. Myers (Rasul II), 563 F.3d 527, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
134. Rasul I, 512 F.3d at 666–67; Rasul II, 563 F.3d at 531. 
135. Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 132, at 2–3, 38–39; see also supra text 
accompanying notes 99–100. 
136. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010), petition for reh‟g en banc 
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―functional approach,‖ rather than requiring any evidence of actual 
membership or other formal connection.
137
 The evidentiary burden 
for establishing such nexus is merely a ―preponderance of the 
evidence‖ standard.138 Perhaps most astonishing, the government 
records used to establish such a nexus, including mere summaries of 
intelligence reports, are entitled to a ―presumption of regularity‖ and 
thus can be relied upon as such by the courts.
139
  
In Al-Bihani v. Obama, the court held that the AUMF provided 
authority for the detention of persons who ―purposefully and 
materially support such forces in hostilities against U.S. coalition 
partners.‖140 It did so by relying not only on the AUMF, but the 
definition of who could be tried by military commission in the 
MCA—a statute that, of course, did not itself provide any authority to 
detain anyone.
141
 It went on to specifically reject the relevance of the 
international law of armed conflict in any such determination.
142
 This 
was later affirmed in Almerfedi v. Obama,
143
 in which the court held 
that the government may detain ―any individual engaged in hostilities 
. . . against the United States, who purposefully and materially 
supported hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, 
or who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces.‖144 This 
interpretation of the AUMF, as authorizing detention separate and 
apart from any necessary nexus to ―al Qaeda and associated forces,‖ 
and entirely unrelated to the 9/11 attacks, vastly broadens the scope 
of who can be detained and is not supported by the text of the 
legislation. It is, moreover, inconsistent with the Supreme Court‘s 
holding in Hamdi,
145
 yet the Supreme Court refused to grant 
 
denied, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011); see also Almerfedi 
v. Obama, 654 F.3d 1, 4 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2739 (2012). 
137. See Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 
(2011); Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
138. Al Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d 8 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert denied, 131 S. Ct. 1812 
(2011). 
139. Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert denied, 132 S. Ct. 2741 (2012). 
For a review of all these cases, see ELSEA & GARCIA, supra note 68. 
140. Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 871. 
143. Almerfedi, 654 F.3d at 4 n.2. 
144. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
145. Cf. ELSEA & GARCIA, supra note 68, at 8–9; Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Replies 
to Congressionial Authorization: International Law, U.S. War Powers, and the Global War 
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certiorari in Al-Bihani.
146
 
In contrast to this, as discussed above, courts strictly construed 
nexus requirements for the purpose of denying liability in rights 
claims. One of the key issues raised by the Court in Kiobel itself was 
whether there was sufficient nexus between the defendant 
corporations and the United States.
147
 The majority held that there 
was not, writing that, ―[c]orporations are often present in many 
countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate 
presence suffices.‖148  
The decision in Arar v. Ashcroft,
149
 a case involving (among 
other things) a claim brought under the TVPA, similarly reflected a 
strict interpretation of nexus requirements. The notorious Arar case 
arose from the detention of Maher Arar, a Canadian-Syrian dual 
national while in transit through New York, and his rendition to 
Syria, where he was interrogated and tortured over the course of a 
year in detention.
150
 The Second Circuit held that in order to ground a 
claim against U.S. defendants under the TVPA for torture committed 
by Syrian agents allegedly at the bidding of and in cooperation with 
the U.S. defendants, the statute required that the U.S. defendants had 
acted ―under color of foreign law, or under its authority.‖151 The 
court construed this very strictly and literally in denying the claim, 
holding that while the defendants may have ―encouraged or solicited 
certain conduct by foreign officials . . . . Such conduct is insufficient 
to establish that the defendants were in some way clothed with the 
authority of Syrian law or that their conduct may be otherwise 
 
on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2653 (2005) (discussing the relevance of the law of armed 
conflict to the interpretation of the AUMF). It should be noted that in a denial of a petition 
for an en banc rehearing of the Al-Bihani case, a concurring opinion by the majority of the 
court suggested that the part of the decision on the relevance of the law of armed conflict to 
the AUMF was non-binding obiter dicta. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(Sentelle, C.J., concurring). 
146. 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011) (mem.). 
147. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013); id. at 1677–78 
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).  
148. Id. at 1669 (majority opinion). 
149. 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009). 
150. See COMM‘N OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO 
MAHER ARAR, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (2006), available at http://www.pch.gc.ca/cs-kc/arar/Arar_e.pdf 
(detailing a full account of the circumstances of Arar‘s detention and torture); see also DEP‘T 
OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., THE REMOVAL OF A CANADIAN CITIZEN TO 
SYRIA (2008), available at http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_08-18_Mar08.pdf. 
151. Arar, 585 F.3d at 568. 
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attributable to Syria.‖152 Writing in dissent, Judge Pooler, joined by 
Judges Calabresi, Sack, and Parker, noted that this interpretation of 
the nexus requirement for purposes of the TVPA was strained and 
inconsistent with other jurisprudence employing a ―color of law‖ 
test.
153
 She argued that when looked at through the prism of agency 
law, the distinction drawn by the majority, between facilitating and 
directing torture and actually engaging in the acts of torture was 
unprincipled, adding that ―[i]f we carry the majority‘s logic to its 
extreme, federal agents could never be responsible for torture 
inflicted under color of foreign law, even if they were in the room 
with the foreign torturers orchestrating the techniques.‖154  
Similarly, as discussed above, the court in Ali v. Rumsfeld 
employed a very strict interpretation of the relevant statutes, holding 
that proof of torture as part of an ATS claim, while clearly a violation 
of the relevant international law prohibitions, could not constitute a 
violation of the ATS itself for purposes of the sovereign immunity 
exception in the Westfall Act and the FTCA.
155
 In dissent, Judge 
Edwards argued that this interpretation was incorrect for a number of 
reasons, and he concluded, ―It is ironic that, under the majority‘s 
approach, United States officials who torture a foreign national in a 
foreign country are not subject to suit in an action brought under [the 
ATS], whereas foreign officials who commit official torture in a 
foreign country may be sued under [the ATS].‖156 Of course, the 
current reality is that virtually no one can be sued for torture under 
the ATS, whether a U.S. or foreign citizen, no matter where the 
torture takes place. The suggestion that a sufficient U.S. connection 
will ground ATS claims is just a chimera. Moreover, the United 
States has detained, interrogated, and has indeed tortured people, on 
the basis of a nexus to terrorist organizations that is very loosely 
defined, established on weak evidence through a flawed process, on 
the basis of legal authority that is very broadly interpreted. At the 
same time, we deny the claims, rights, and remedies of the same 
people due to strictly defined nexus requirements and narrowly 
construed interpretations of governing statutes. 
 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 629 (Pooler, J., dissenting). 
154. Id.  
155. Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 755–76 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
156. Id. at 779 (Edwards, J., dissenting). 
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D. Extrajudicial Killing 
The final issue I will explore is extrajudicial killing. It was one 
of the specific issues raised in the ATS claims of the plaintiffs in 
Kiobel. It was also an issue brought before the federal courts in the 
case of Al-Aulaqi v. Obama.
157
 The case involved the now-famous 
Anwar Al-Aulaqi,
158
 the dual U.S.-Yemeni national who was a 
propagandist for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) until he 
was killed along with another dual-U.S. citizen and several other 
people in a CIA drone strike in Yemen on September 30, 2011.
159
 
The lawsuit was commenced after it was reported in early 2010 that 
Al-Aulaqi had been placed on a kill-list authorizing his targeting in 
the U.S. drone-based targeted killing program.
160
 His father, Nasser, 
brought an application in federal court, on behalf of both his son and 
himself, for an injunction to prevent the government from killing Al-
Aulaqi.
161
 Of interest for the purposes of this Article, one of the 
claims was brought under the ATS, based on the argument that the 
killing of Al-Aulaqi outside of the context of armed conflict, and 
outside of circumstances in which he posed a concrete, specific and 
imminent threat to life or physical safety, would constitute an 
extrajudicial killing in violation of both treaty and customary 
international law principles.
162
  
The claim of Al-Aulaqi‘s father was dismissed on several 
grounds, including standing and the application of the political 
question doctrine.
163
 But among the grounds for dismissing the claim, 
Judge Bates of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
held that there was no cognizable claim under the ATS, and that in 
any event the United States had not waived sovereign immunity with 
respect to any claim under the ATS.
164
 It is this aspect of the decision 
that will be examined here. Significantly, the court began by 
 
157. 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010). 
158. His name is typically spelled al-Awlaki in major newspapers, but for consistency I 
use the spelling used in the judgment. 
159. Mark Mazzetti et al., C.I.A. Strike Kills U.S.-Born Militant in a Car in Yemen, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2011, at A1. Also killed were Samir Khan, an American-Pakistani dual 
national who published an English language online magazine called ―Inspire‖ for al-Qaeda. 
Id. 
160. See, e.g., Tom Leonard, Barack Obama Orders Killing of US Cleric Anwar al-
Awlaki, THE TELEGRAPH, Apr. 7, 2010. 
161. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 8. 
162. Id. at 12. 
163. Id. at 35, 52. 
164. Id. at 35, 37, 40. 
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recognizing that extrajudicial killing does constitute a violation of the 
kind of well-established and widely accepted principle of customary 
international law that is required by Sosa to ground a claim under the 
ATS, and it noted that this proposition had been accepted in several 
other cases.
165
 In this sense, then, the claim advanced was entirely 
―cognizable‖ in ATS terms. 
Judge Bates went on to decide, however, that while the 
extrajudicial killing might itself be actionable under the ATS, the 
threat of such a killing did not constitute a violation of customary 
international law, and so no relief could be had under the ATS.
166
 
This conclusion seems absurd. The application was for an injunction 
to prevent the commission of an act that the court acknowledged to 
be a violation of law that is cognizable and actionable under the legal 
system in question. The injunction was to prevent that act, not the 
threat of such, and so it is the act that grounds the claim.  
In addition to this argument, however, the court also held that 
Nasser Al-Aulaqi could not bring the claim under the ATS on behalf 
of his son Anwar, since Anwar Al-Aulaqi was a U.S. citizen in 
addition to being Yemeni, and the ATS is limited to claims by 
aliens.
167
 This argument ignored the fact that Anwar Al-Aulaqi was 
also a Yemeni national, and his legitimate claim to foreign nationality 
could, arguably, have satisfied the ―alien‖ requirement of the ATS. 
But that aside, there is some irony here: for in Kiobel it was said that 
the parties have an insufficient connection with the United States to 
ground a claim under the ATS,
168
 while here in Al-Aulaqi the court in 
part dismissed the case on the argument that the petitioner had too 
great a connection to the United States.
169
  
In the final result, of course, the claim was dismissed, no 
injunction was issued, and Nasser Al-Aulaqi‘s son was killed, as 
feared, some ten months later (Anwar Al-Aulaqi‘s sixteen-year-old 
son was similarly killed in a separate drone attack in Yemen a couple 
 
165. Id. at 36 (citing Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 377, 383 n.4 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1178–79 
(C.D. Cal. 2005); Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 241–45 (2d Cir. 1995); Forti v. Suarez-
Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1542 (N.D. Cal. 1987)). 
166. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 36. 
167. Id. at 39. 
168. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). 
169. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 39. 
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of weeks thereafter.)
170
 In the introduction to his opinion, Judge Bates 
noted that the case raised a number of what he called ―stark and 
perplexing questions,‖ among which he included the question of 
whether ―the Executive [can] order the assassination of a U.S. citizen 
without first affording him any form of judicial process whatsoever, 
based on the mere assertion that he is a dangerous member of a 
terrorist organization?‖ and ―how does the evolving AQAP relate to 
core al Qaeda for purposes of assessing the legality of targeting 
AQAP (or its principles) under the [AUMF]?‖171 He concluded, 
however, that none of these questions could be addressed given that 
the case had to be dismissed on grounds of non-justiciability.
172
  
As a lower court bound by the technical doctrines on standing, 
that may have been entirely correct. But the questions remain, and 
they relate to my broader consideration of the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law. The killing of a person within the territory of 
another state, as an act both implementing and said to be authorized 
by one‘s own domestic law, is certainly an extreme example of the 
exercise of both prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction. Some will 
say that it was an act of war authorized by international law, but I 
will address below why a court would have good reason to question 
that proposition. Similarly, some instances of targeted killing are said 
to have been consented to by the host government—the 
administration claims this to have been the case with the killing of 
Al-Aulaqi. Consent of the government affects the self-defense and jus 
ad bellum claims, but in the context of an armed conflict, in which 
the law of armed conflict applies, such consent does not affect the 
law of armed conflict analysis of whether it is lawful to kill a 
person.
173
 Regardless of consent, there must be an armed conflict in 
existence for there to be any justification for the killing under the law 
of armed conflict, and the killing must comply with the law of armed 
conflict. And in a non-armed conflict situation, consent is only 
meaningful if the consenting government could have itself lawfully 
killed the person, in similar fashion, under its own domestic laws and 
 
170. Conor Friedersdorf, How Team Obama Justifies the Killing of a 16-Year-Old 
American, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/ 
10/how-team-obama-justifies-the-killing-of-a-16-year-old-american/264028/.  
171. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 9. 
172. Id.  
173. Cf. Craig Martin, Going Medieval: Targeted Killing, Self-Defense and the Jus ad 
Bellum Regime, in TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW AND MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD 
223, 233–34 (Claire Finkelstein et al. eds., 2012) (discussing the issue of consent as it 
applies to jus ad bellum). 
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under international human rights law. Moreover, there is no question 
that the governments of Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia have objected 
to many of the targeted killing strikes within their territory.
174
 As 
such, there can be little question that this constitutes an 
extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction, and it is difficult to imagine 
an exercise of jurisdiction more likely to cause friction and conflict 
than this. Why, then, was the question of extraterritoriality not even 
raised in the Al-Aulaqi case? Of course, there will be some that will 
argue that there are good reasons why the courts would not need to 
consider such issues. It is to those arguments that I turn next. 
IV. QUALIFICATIONS AND OBJECTIONS  
A number of objections could be raised to the argument that 
these GWOT cases illustrate the exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, and that the courts, if they are indeed concerned about 
extraterritoriality, should have examined this issue more closely in 
these cases. As discussed earlier, there are three primary reasons that 
courts would have no cause to inquire into whether an exercise of 
jurisdiction is an impermissibly extraterritorial application of law: 
first, that the action is not an exercise of U.S. jurisdiction at all, since 
it is really an implementation of international law; second, that the 
conduct falls within one of the exceptions to the international law 
prohibition on the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction; or third, 
Congress explicitly intended that the law be implemented 
extraterritorially, and thus the presumptions against extraterritoriality, 
and the Charming Betsy doctrine, do not apply or are overcome. A 
variant on the third argument, specific to the GWOT cases, might be 
that the Executive is permitted to engage in the impugned conduct 
under the Commander-in-Chief power under the Constitution, and 
thus no congressionial authority is required and the presumptions do 
not apply. These arguments form the basis for the three most likely 
objections to the suggestion that we should be more concerned about 
 
174. See David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, As Rift Deepens, Kerry has a Warning for 
Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2011, at A16; Greg Bruno, U.S. Drone Activities in Pakistan, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (July 19, 2010), http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/us-drone-
activities-pakistan/p22659#p6. Similarly, there are questions regarding Yemen‘s consent to 
strikes. See Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Is Intensifying a Secret Campaign of Yemen Airstrikes, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 9, 2011, at A6. Strikes in Somalia have occurred when there has been 
insufficient central authority to provide meaningful consent. See Mark Mazzetti & Eric 
Schmitt, U.S. Expands its Drone War Into Somalia, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2011, at A1. 
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the extraterritorial application of U.S. law that is reflected in the 
GWOT cases. In this section I will briefly explore the contours of 
these objections and the possible responses to them.  
A. International, Not Domestic Law 
I begin with the first likely objection, that some of the impugned 
conduct by the United States is authorized by the international law of 
armed conflict, and thus constitutes an enforcement of international 
law rather than the extraterritorial application of U.S. law. First, it 
bears noting that this argument would be rather ironic in the context 
of our discussion of Kiobel. Recall the argument that I made earlier, 
based on the analysis of several experts on the issue, that the 
operation of the ATS is itself an enforcement of international law 
principles and thus should not be understood as an exercise of 
prescriptive jurisdiction.
175
 That argument is far truer of the ATS than 
it is for the exercises of jurisdiction considered above in the GWOT 
cases. But, of course, the Kiobel Court rejected that argument as it 
relates to the ATS.
176
 If the standards applied in Kiobel were 
employed here, this argument should surely fail. 
Leaving that irony aside, however, there is a strong argument 
that the conduct giving rise to the GWOT cases here under 
consideration cannot be justified by international law, or be 
understood as an implementation of international law. Beginning 
with torture, the prohibition on torture is a jus cogens or peremptory 
norm of international law, meaning that it cannot be derogated from 
under any circumstances.
177
 So, while the U.S. courts may have 
found that such torture was within the ―scope of legitimate 
employment‖ of government agents for purposes of the FTCA,178 it 
could never be consistent with international law, far less be 
understood as implementing it. But aside from torture, some argue 
that the detention of ―enemy combatants‖ at Guantánamo Bay, 
Bagram, and elsewhere, as well as the targeted killing of ―enemy 
combatants‖ with missiles fired from drones within the territory of 
countries such as Yemen, Pakistan, and Somalia, is justified by and 
conducted in accordance with the international law of armed conflict. 
This argument suffers a number of serious problems, which I briefly 
 
175. See supra Part II.C. 
176. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664–66 (2013). 
177. See supra note 44. 
178. Rasul v. Myers (Rasul I), 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008), vacated, 555 U.S. 1083 
(2008); see also supra text accompanying notes 115–117. 
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review.  
I begin by looking in more detail at the government‘s legal 
justification for the targeted killing program, as this rationale is more 
fully developed, but it would apply similarly to the authority for 
detaining those captured outside the hot battlefields of Afghanistan 
and Iraq. The justification was developed in several legal memoranda 
from the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice. These 
have yet to be publicly disclosed, and the Obama Administration 
continues to resist disclosure of the memos, both in court
179
 and in its 
relations with Congress.
180
 Our best information comes from a leaked 
Department of Justice White Paper summarizing the legal 
arguments.
181
 It argues that the legal justification rests on two 
foundations. First, that the United States is in a transnational armed 
conflict with al-Qaeda and ―associated forces,‖ as authorized under 
domestic law by the AUMF, and that the United States is therefore 
permitted to kill members of those armed organizations as 
combatants under the international law of armed conflict. Second, 
and in any event, the United States may kill such persons as an 
exercise of the right of self-defense as provided for in Article 51 of 
the UN Charter.
182
 
I will focus on the ―armed conflict‖ argument, as the self-
defense claim implicates the jus ad bellum regime, which governs the 
use of force against states. While this self-defense justification also 
suffers deep flaws, that argument is less relevant to the inquiry 
here.
183
 It only relates to the targeted killing program, not the 
detention cases, but even in the case of targeted killing, even if the 
use of force is so justified, the specific targeting is still governed by 
the law of armed conflict. Thus, the more relevant justification, for 
both the targeted killing program and the detention cases, is that the 
 
179. See N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
180. Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, White House Tactic for C.I.A. Bid Holds Back Drone 
Memos, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2013, at A1. 
181. U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A 
U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA‘IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED 
FORCE (2011) [hereinafter DOJ WHITE PAPER], available at http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint 
/doj-lethal.pdf.  
182. Id. at 1–2. 
183. See Martin, supra note 173 (containing my own analysis of the extent to which the 
targeted killing program cannot be justified under the doctrine of self-defense and thus 
frequently leads to the use of force in violation of the jus ad bellum regime). 
9-Martin  8/28/2013  9:25 PM 
2013] KIOBEL, EXTRATERRITORIALITY, AND THE ―GWOT‖ 189 
United States is in an armed conflict, and that these actions are thus 
authorized by and are consistent with the international law of armed 
conflict. But the question of whether a state can be in a 
―transnational‖ non-international armed conflict with non-state actors 
such as al-Qaeda and AQAP is an issue that must be determined in 
accordance with the criteria provided for within in the international 
law of armed conflict itself.
184
 Many international law scholars, 
organizations, and institutions relevant to the law of armed conflict, 
have rejected the claim that the United States can be in an armed 
conflict with non-state actors such as AQAP, in a battlefield that 
extends to wherever in the world that its members happen to be, and 
in particular, to the territory of states in which the United States is not 
otherwise involved as a belligerent in an armed conflict.
185
  
In short, the argument is that the interaction with these 
amorphous terrorist groups, which are typically characterized by an 
atomized and anonymized cell structure, does not satisfy the essential 
criteria for determining the existence of an armed conflict, namely: 
(1) that the armed groups have a sufficient level of organization and 
structure; (2) that the conflict between such organized armed groups 
and the state is characterized by protracted military hostilities of 
sufficient intensity and duration; and (3) that such hostilities have 
some geographical or spatial limitation.
186
 The United States simply 
cannot be in a global armed conflict with whichever group it defines 
as hostile, wherever members of such groups happen to be. The 
ramifications of this objection are clear. If a killing or detention is 
undertaken in a situation that does not constitute an armed conflict, 
then the law of armed conflict does not apply, and the conduct cannot 
 
184. Those criteria are captured in what is known as the Tadić test. Prosecutor v. Tadić, 
Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 
¶ 70 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); see also Dapo Akande, 
Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 32–35 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., 2012). See generally 
LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT (2002); ANTHONY CULLEN, THE 
CONCEPT OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
(2010). 
185. See, e.g., Jakob Kellenberger, President of the Int‘l Comm. of the Red Cross, 
Confronting Complexity Through Law: The Case for Reason, Vision and Humanity, Grotius 
Lecture at the American Society of International Law (Mar. 28, 2012), available at 
http://intercrossblog.icrc.org/blog/kellenberger-grotius-lecture-asil-case-reason-vision-and-
humanity; Marco Sassoli, Transnational Armed Groups and International Humanitarian 
Law (Harvard Univ. Program on Humanitarian Policy & Conflict Research Occasional Paper 
Series, 2006), available at http://www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files/publications/Occas 
ionalPaper6.pdf. 
186. These are the three criteria of the Tadić test. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, ¶ 70. 
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be justified as being authorized by, or being an implementation of, 
the law of armed conflict.  
The problems do not end there for the argument that the GWOT 
cases arise from conduct that is authorized by international law, as 
opposed to being an exercise of U.S. jurisdiction. Suppose for the 
sake of argument that there is such an armed conflict with al-Qaeda 
and associated forces, or conversely that there is a non-international 
armed conflict in Yemen or Pakistan, in which the United States is 
providing assistance to the government, or indeed that the United 
States is using force against such states in self-defense. Even in that 
situation, individuals such as Anwar Al-Aulaqi could still not be 
classified as ―combatants,‖ who could thus be killed at any time on 
the basis of such status. First, the concept of ―combatant,‖ as defined 
in the Geneva Conventions, is limited to international armed 
conflict.
187
 In an international armed conflict, only combatants as 
defined may be targeted on the basis of status alone. And regardless 
of the type of armed conflict, persons not coming within the 
definition of combatant under the Geneva Conventions,
188
 even if 
they are clearly members of a terrorist organization, would be 
considered civilians who can only be targeted ―for such time as they 
are taking direct part in hostilities.‖189 That is, they can only be 
targeted on the basis of their conduct, not on the basis of their status. 
The Israeli Supreme Court, in considering a challenge to Israel‘s own 
targeted killing program, confirmed this proposition and rejected 
arguments that Hamas terrorists could be targeted at will on the basis 
of some new status of ―unlawful enemy combatants.‖190  
These objections, of course, echo the question raised by Judge 
Bates in Al Maqaleh as to whether a person could be killed merely on 
 
187. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 43(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; see also GARY SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT 187–91 (2010). It should be noted that while the United States is not a party to the 
Additional Protocols, and it continues to object to certain specific provisions, it has accepted 
that most of the provisions of the treaty, including Article 51(3), constitute customary 
international law. 
188. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 187, art. 4. 
189. Additional Protocol I, supra note 187, art. 51(3). 
190. HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel 
57(6) IsrSC 285 [2005] (Isr.). 
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the bare assertion of membership in a group.
191
 It is true that, in 
contrast to the contested status of the detainees in Rasul v. Bush,
192
 
Anwar Al-Aulaqi was a self-professed member of AQAP and was at 
minimum a propagandist for that organization, in which role he 
helped to inspire radical opposition to the United States.
193
 But what 
is not known is to what extent he was involved in operational aspects 
of terrorist attacks, or to what extent he was directly participating in 
such attacks, and moreover, whether he was engaging in such activity 
so as to truly pose a direct and imminent threat at the time he was 
killed.
194
  
A final point to be made with respect to the targeted killing 
program is that Al-Aulaqi was killed by a CIA drone strike, as are 
many if not most of the ―insurgents‖ and ―militants‖ killed in strikes 
in both Yemen and Pakistan.
 195
 But members of the CIA are not 
themselves ―combatants‖ privileged with the authority to kill under 
the law of armed conflict. They are themselves civilians rather than 
combatants as the term is defined in the Geneva Conventions.
196
 
Even if one accepts that the armed forces of the United States were 
authorized to kill Al-Aulaqi and others under the law of armed 
conflict, the CIA was certainly not.
197
 Thus, even here the conduct 
 
191.727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2010); see supra text accompanying note 171. 
192. 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
193. See, e.g., Mark Mazzetti et al., How a U.S. Citizen Came to Be in America‟s Cross 
Hairs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2013, at A1. 
194. The word ―imminent‖ here is used in the sense that it is normally understood in the 
law of armed conflict and jus ad bellum doctrine of self-defense, not in the highly 
unconventional and elastic meaning that is imposed upon it in the DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra 
note 181, at 7–8. Imminence is traditionally related to the right of self-defense. See, e.g., 
YORUM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 182–87, 209–10 (2005); CHRISTINE 
GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 160–65 (2008); NILS MELTZER, 
TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 346–53 (2008). 
195. There is a division of responsibility between the CIA and the Department of Defense. 
See Micha Zenko, Transferring CIA Drone Strikes to the Pentagon, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS (Apr. 2013), http://www.cfr.org/defensehomeland-security/transferring-cia-drone 
-strikes-pentagon/p30434.  
196. CIA operations are understood to be affected by a number of international legal 
norms. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 187, art. 4; Additional Protocol I, supra 
note 187, art. 51(3); see also YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE 
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 27–33 (2004); SOLIS, supra note 187, at 220–27. 
197. This point was highlighted when Harold Koh, then legal counsel to the State 
Department, argued that the plan to indict and try Omar Khadr, the Canadian detainee at 
Guantánamo Bay, for the ―crime‖ of engaging in hostilities in Afghanistan and killing an 
American medic while not a privileged combatant, would mean that he was being prosecuted 
for the very same thing that the CIA was currently engaging in. See Scott Horton, The Khadr 
Boomerang, HARPER‘S (May 25, 2010, 1:26 PM), http://harpers.org/blog/2010/05/the-khadr-
boomerang/. 
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cannot be said to constitute an implementation of international law, 
or to be authorized by international law. 
Similar arguments apply to many of the detention cases 
discussed above. A number of detainees, such as those that brought 
claims in Rasul v. Bush,
198
 and in Al Maqaleh v. Gates,
199
 were 
nationals of countries that had friendly relations with the United 
States, and they were captured in countries other than Afghanistan 
and Iraq, with which the United States was not engaged in armed 
conflict. The justification for their capture, rendition, interrogation 
and indefinite detention without charge is that they are members or 
supporters of Al- Qaeda or ―associated forces‖ with which the United 
States is in a transnational armed conflict. As discussed above, if that 
proposition is unfounded as a matter of international law, then of 
course the justification for capturing and detaining them is similarly 
flawed. Moreover, as discussed with respect to Al-Aulaqi, even if one 
accepts that there can be such a global ―transnational‖ non-
international armed conflict with al-Qaeda and ―associated forces,‖ 
the capture and detention of persons in neutral states on the basis of 
―material support‖ of ―co-belligerent‖ non-state actors, or on the 
basis of vaguely understood notions of ―links‖ to such groups, cannot 
be supported by the law of armed conflict. Even the D.C. Circuit has 
begun to recognize that ―material support for terrorism‖ is not an 
offense under the international law of armed conflict.
200
 If the 
detention is said to be authorized exclusively by international law, as 
opposed to domestic law (and hence comprising an exercise of 
domestic jurisdiction), one would expect some deeper inquiry in 
these cases to determine whether the detention in each specific case 
was consistent with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions. 
Let me pause here to put this discussion into context for the 
purposes of my examination of the extraterritorial application of U.S. 
law. I am here addressing the potential objection that the government 
conduct in the GWOT cases I have discussed was in fact undertaken 
pursuant to international law rather than being an exercise of 
domestic jurisdiction. The upshot of the foregoing analysis, however, 
is that if the international law critics are correct, in that the United 
 
198. 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
199. 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
200. See Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (stating that 
material support for terrorism is not a war crime under international law). 
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States lacks a basis in the law of armed conflict to engage in this type 
of targeted killing or detention of individuals captured outside of 
theaters of traditional armed conflict, on the basis of their alleged 
membership in al-Qaeda or ―associated forces,‖ then such conduct is 
a violation of international law in a number of respects, not least of 
which being that the targeted killing violates the customary 
international law prohibition on extrajudicial killing.
201
 But the 
extrajudicial killing, as well as the capture, interrogation, and 
indefinite detention of individuals, if not authorized by international 
law, would thus constitute an extraordinary exercise of executive 
enforcement jurisdiction extraterritorially. The killing of foreign 
nationals, within the territory of a foreign state, for activity that is 
undertaken in a foreign state, is an extreme exercise of jurisdiction 
abroad, and would violate the international law principles on 
jurisdiction. 
Within the scope of this Article, I cannot resolve these 
arguments relating to the validity of the claim of a transnational 
armed conflict with al-Qaeda and ―associated forces,‖ or whether the 
targeted killing program and the detention of those captured outside 
of Afghanistan might be otherwise legal under international law. But 
it is indisputable that the claims are highly controversial. If these 
claims were the sole legal basis for detentions, targeted killing, and 
the other conduct discussed here, and thus the basis for arguing that 
such conduct was not an impermissible exercise of U.S. jurisdiction, 
then one would expect that those arguments would have at least been 
subjected to some inquiry and consideration by the courts. But the 
courts have not taken up this issue. To the extent the issue of whether 
the laws of armed conflict apply, the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld
202
 did find that there was a non-international armed conflict 
in existence in Afghanistan, where Hamdan had been captured.
203
 
And in Hamdan v. United States,
204
 a later case involving the same 
detainee, the D.C. Circuit found that material support for terrorism is 
not a war crime under international law.
205
 But in both Hamdan and 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
206
 the Supreme Court was quite careful in 
limiting its discussion to the actual armed conflict that was 
 
201. This has been acknowledged by U.S. courts. See supra note 165 and accompanying 
text. 
202. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
203. Id. at 566–68.  
204. 696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
205. Id. at 1251. 
206. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
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indisputably in process in Afghanistan. There has been little other 
inquiry into the validity of claims that international law grounds the 
actions undertaken elsewhere. Indeed, in Al-Bihani v. Obama,
207
 the 
D.C. Circuit rejected the notion that the international law of armed 
conflict should inform in any way the interpretation of the AUMF, 
implying that the AUMF was the sole authority for government 
action.
208
 
B. Exceptions to International Law Principles on Jurisdiction 
The second possible objection to the suggestion that the 
detention and other treatment of foreigners captured abroad is an 
impermissible exercise of jurisdiction, is that such conduct falls 
within the exceptions to the international law prohibition on the 
extraterritorial application of domestic law. The exceptions relevant 
here are the objective territorial principle (effects doctrine), the 
passive personality principle, and the protective principle. It will be 
recalled from the discussion in Part II that the validity and scope of 
both the objective territoriality principle (which permits the exercise 
of jurisdiction over conduct outside of the territory of the state that 
will have substantial effects within its territory), and the passive 
personality principle (which permits the exercise of jurisdiction 
outside of the territory of the state for the protection of nationals 
abroad) are somewhat controversial. The third exception, the 
protective principle, is far narrower in scope than is typically 
understood. I explore their application here briefly. 
The 1935 Harvard Research Draft Convention
209
 was an early 
attempt to develop an international consensus on the limits on the 
exercise of domestic jurisdiction under international law. It never 
advanced to form the basis of a treaty, but it continues to be referred 
to as being important in defining and articulating the scope of a 
number of the core concepts developed therein. The passive 
personality principle was one of the principles articulated in the Draft 
Convention. Nevertheless, a significant segment of the international 
community historically has rejected the passive personality 
 
207. 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010), petition for reh‟g en banc denied, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011). 
208. See id. at 871.  
209. Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 23. 
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principle.
210
 It may be argued that regardless of claims by certain 
countries, it does not constitute an accepted principle of international 
law, though James Crawford notes that ―such objections have not, 
however, prevented the development of something approaching a 
consensus on the use of passive personality in certain cases, often 
linked to international terrorism.‖211 That assertion notwithstanding, 
it is a principle that the United States itself traditionally has opposed 
and rejected in areas not related to terrorism, and its own attempts to 
employ the passive personality in certain kinds of terrorism cases has 
met with criticism both at home and abroad.
212
  
In any event, even if the principle is accepted as being 
recognized, the narrow range of cases in which the exercise of 
jurisdiction may be permissible under the passive personality 
principle would be limited to those involving criminal prosecution or 
civil actions in regular courts for deliberate terrorist attacks aimed at 
the state‘s nationals abroad. These would involve judicial 
proceedings in the kinds of cases that are least likely to provoke the 
objection of the other sovereign states implicated.
213
 The acceptance 
of this narrow exercise of jurisdiction relies not only on the universal 
condemnation of the kind of terrorist act in question, but also the 
improbability that such exercise of jurisdiction would lead to 
unlimited or unexpected criminal liability.
214
 As discussed above, one 
of the recurring problems in the GWOT cases is the considerable 
uncertainty regarding the process by which individuals have been 
identified for detention, targeting, or otherwise been made subject to 
the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction, together with the very limited degree 
of judicial oversight to determine whether the initial identification 
was justified.
215
 Moreover, almost invariably they arise from 
suspicion of involvement with certain groups, rather than prosecution 
 
210. Robbins, supra note 23, at 10–11. 
211. CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 461; see O‘CONNELL, supra note 25, at 828–29; 
ANDREW CLAPHAM, BRIERLY‘S LAW OF NATIONS 243 (7th ed. 2012); Watson, supra note 25, 
at 14–15, 30. 
212. Robinson, supra note 25, at 487–89, 496; Robbins, supra note 23, at 10–11. 
213. For instance, the line of foreign sovereign immunity cases against Iran for damages 
arising from its vicarious liability for the terrorist activities of groups such as Hezbollah. See, 
e.g., Belkin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 667 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Another 
example can be found in the prosecutions for hijackings, which have drawn support from the 
universal condemnation reflected in the anti-hijacking conventions. See, e.g., United States 
v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 1988), aff‟d, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
214. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 902. 
215. Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 132, at 2–3, 38–39; see also supra text 
accompanying notes 99–100. 
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for terrorist attacks already conducted. Finally, they do not involve 
adjudication in regular courts, but rather detention without charge, 
torture, and extrajudicial killing.  
The objective territoriality principle has been embraced by the 
United States to justify, among other things, the extraterritorial 
application of antitrust law.
216
 But this principle too is not widely 
accepted in international law, and to the extent that it is accepted, it 
tends to be narrowly construed. Even under the more recent U.S. 
formulations of the principle, the effect of the conduct within the 
United States must be substantial and direct.
217
 While it might be 
permissible to extend jurisdiction under this test to those members of 
al-Qaeda who had been involved in the 9/11 attacks, the same cannot 
be said for the seizure and detention of persons on scant evidence that 
they have some level of affiliation with, or are providing some level 
of ―material support‖ to, terrorist groups said to be associated with al-
Qaeda.
218
 This is all the more so for members of groups like al-
Shabaab, which most acknowledge are locally focused, and pose no 
direct threat to the United States.
219
 
Turning to the protective principle, it contemplates the legitimate 
extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction in respect of conduct by 
foreigners abroad that pose a direct and substantial threat to the 
national security of the state. Once again, U.S. courts have at times 
construed this principle in the broadest possible terms, to justify such 
conduct as the criminal prosecution of foreigners for murder 
committed abroad in the course of international narcotics trading.
220
 
 
216. See supra note 55. 
217. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§§ 402, 403 (1987); Morrison v. Nat‘l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2889–90 (2010). In 
United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003), the Second Circuit relied upon the 
principle to support the prosecution of foreign terrorists plotting to destroy foreign aircraft 
with no American passengers, flying between third states, though the primary ground was 
that Congress intended the statute in question to have extraterritorial effect. 
218. On the problems with the determination process, and the deference courts have 
shown the evidentiary standards, see supra Part III.B–C. 
219. See, e.g., Jonathan Masters, Al-Shabaab, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Feb. 5, 
2013), http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabaab/p18650. But see Al Shabaab: Recruitment and 
Radicalization within the Muslim American Community and the Threat to the Homeland: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 112th Cong. 204 (2011) (statement of 
Chairman Peter T. King).  
220. United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1994), is a prime example of 
this. The case involved the prosecution of Mexican nationals for the torture and murder of 
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But it is important to emphasize that from its first articulation in the 
Harvard Research Draft Convention in 1935,
221
 the international law 
perspective on the protective principle was that it permits the exercise 
of prescriptive jurisdiction (and of course adjudicative jurisdiction) 
with respect to crimes committed by a foreigner against the security, 
territorial integrity, or political independence of the state.
222
 This 
formulation is construed narrowly to mean that the crime triggering 
the right to exercise jurisdiction must be directed at, and threaten the 
integrity of, government functions and the institutions of the state, 
rather than purely civilian targets.
223
  
Perhaps ironically, it has been the U.S. and U.K. legal systems 
that were traditionally viewed as maintaining the most restrictive 
view of the protective principle.
224
 Moreover, this exception for the 
exercise of jurisdiction is fundamentally understood to be for the 
purpose of criminal prosecution for crimes already committed. This 
emphasis is reflected in the Harvard Draft Convention, which 
contains limitations relating to double jeopardy, trials in absentia, and 
guarantees of fair and impartial trials of the accused by regularly 
constituted courts, as well as protection against cruel, unusual or 
inhuman punishments thereafter.
225
 Thus, again, the prosecution in 
federal courts of the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks on the Pentagon, 
being an institution of the state, would clearly fall within the scope of 
the exception. But the exercise of prescriptive and enforcement 
jurisdiction in the indefinite detention, interrogation, prosecution in 
military commissions, and extrajudicial killing of individuals who are 
suspected of involvement in terrorist attacks on civilians would 
clearly not come within the established scope of the principle. That 
 
two Americans in Mexico under the mistaken belief that they were DEA agents. The Ninth 
Circuit sought to support its extraterritorial application of the relevant criminal statute by 
relying in part on the protective principle, characterizing it as permitting the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law to conduct that ―may impinge on the territorial integrity, security, or 
political independence of the United States.‖ Id. at 840. That is not an accurate statement of 
the principle, nor could it justify the exercise of jurisdiction to prosecute the murder of 
nationals abroad. Even had the victims been DEA officials, their murder would not have 
constituted a threat to the security of the United States sufficient to trigger the protective 
principle. 
221. Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 23. 
222. See id. at 543. 
223. See id. at 557; see also Robbins, supra note 23, at 10; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402, cmt. f (1987). But see CRAWFORD, 
supra note 21, at 462. 
224. See Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 23; Robbins, supra note 23, at 1223–25. 
225. Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 23, at 596–601 (containing Article 12 of the 
Draft Convention, describing the prosecution and punishment of aliens). 
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may strike many as being bizarre, and a good reason for thinking that 
the international law principles on jurisdiction are out of date and in 
need of adjustment. But these are the principles that the Court 
purported to be concerned with in the oral argument in Kiobel, and 
indeed to which Justice Breyer referred in his concurring opinion.
226
  
What is more, unless one fully accepts the international law of 
armed conflict justifications for the targeted killing and indefinite 
detention of those captured beyond any theater of armed conflict, 
such acts of extrajudicial killing and arbitrary detention without 
charge constitute a most extreme form of enforcement jurisdiction in 
apparent violation of long-established principles at the foundation of 
the rule of law. This would militate against any justifications 
grounded in any of these three principles of jurisdiction. One cannot 
imagine for a moment that the United States would accept such 
arguments were the Chinese to take to launching operations within 
the territory of neighboring countries to kill Uighur ―militants‖ said 
to be plotting attacks against China from safe-houses abroad, or 
detaining nationals of third states captured abroad for ―material 
support‖ for the Uighurs. Consider the international reaction to the 
suspected Israeli killing of the Hamas leader Mahmoud al-Mabhouh 
in Dubai in 2010,
227
 or the poisoning of former Russian FSB/KGB 
agent Alexander Litvinenko in London in 2006, thought to be 
conducted by agents of the Kremlin.
228
 There was no talk then of 
such actions being justifiable exercises of jurisdiction under the 
protective or objective territorial principles. 
C. Congressionial Authority and the Presumptions 
The third objection is that the conduct in question in these cases 
was explicitly authorized by Congress, and thus the twin 
presumptions—that is, the presumption against extraterritoriality, and 
 
226. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1671 (2013) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in the judgment). Though it is submitted that his assertion that the United States 
could exercise jurisdiction in the event that U.S. interests were sufficiently implicated, this is 
not consistent with the international law principles to which he refers. 
227. See, e.g., Ian Black & Rory McCarthy, Mystery over Dubai Killing of Hamas Official 
Deepens, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 24, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010 /feb/24/mos 
sad-hamas-dubai-passports. 
228. See, e.g., Esther Addley, Alexander Litvinenko: Coroner Urges Public Inquiry into 
Death, THE GUARDIAN, June 5, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/05/alex 
ander-litvinenko-coroner-public-inquiry1. 
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the Charming Betsy doctrine, which essentially presumes that 
Congress does not intend to violate international law—have quite 
simply been overcome by clear congressionial intent. In other words, 
the conduct may indeed constitute the extraterritorial application of 
U.S. law, and the resulting exercise of prescriptive and enforcement 
jurisdiction may be in violation of the international law principles of 
jurisdiction, and indeed violate other substantive principles of 
international law; but the courts need not consider such issues if 
Congress has explicitly authorized the conduct with clear intent that it 
apply in precisely that way, in respect of foreign persons for conduct 
undertaken in foreign territory.  
There are a number of responses to this objection. It is useful to 
begin by recalling that both presumptions flow from a respect for 
both international law and the sovereign autonomy of foreign legal 
systems, and an understanding that the United States would typically 
avoid engaging in conduct that either violated international law or 
was likely to impinge on the sovereignty of another state or cause 
conflicts with foreign laws. The presumptions are in fact interrelated, 
since even without an explicit presumption against extraterritoriality, 
the Charming Betsy doctrine militates against the interpretation of a 
statute so as to apply extraterritorially in violation of the international 
law principles on jurisdiction.  
The corollary to the presumptions, of course, is that where 
Congress clearly intends a law to apply extraterritorially, or where 
the statute cannot be construed in a manner that is consistent with 
principles of international law,
229
 then the legislation will be given 
effect regardless of extraterritorial application or inconsistency with 
international law.
230
 But one of the problems that has dogged this 
doctrine is the uneven standards that the courts have applied in 
 
229. This overly simplifies the issue of course. If the principle is in a treaty to which the 
United States is a party, which is more recent in time than the statute, and the principle is 
found in a provision that is construed to be self-executing, then of course the treaty provision 
may be held to defeat the statutory provision. See U.S. CONST. art. VII; RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115(2) (1987). See 
generally LORI DAMROSCH ET AL., PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 685 (2009). 
230. See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 92 (2d Cir. 2003) (―[W]hile customary 
international law may inform the judgment of our courts in an appropriate case, it cannot 
alter or constrain the making of law by the political branches of government . . . .‖); United 
States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (―Yunis seeks to portray international 
law as a self-executing code that trumps domestic law whenever the two conflict. That effort 
misconceives the role of judges as appliers of international law and as participants in the 
federal system. Our duty is to enforce the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United 
States, not to conform the law of the land to norms of customary international law.‖). 
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assessing the ―clear congressionial intent.‖ This, of course, turns out 
to be one of the core issues in the Court‘s majority decision in Kiobel 
itself. Thus, as already briefly discussed, the Court has in the past 
searched for ―implicit intent‖ in extending the reach of antitrust law 
and other statutes to conduct overseas. It has done so by adopting 
functional and instrumentalist approaches; thus in United States v. 
Bowman,
231
 a pre-World War II case, the Court held that a statute 
criminalizing conspiracy to defraud a U.S.-owned corporation must 
apply to conduct undertaken on the high seas, since to find otherwise 
would vastly limit the utility of the statute and create ―a large 
immunity for frauds as easily committed by citizens on the high seas 
and in foreign countries as at home.‖232  
We now know that the Court in Kiobel rejected any such 
functional or instrumentalist approach to the inquiry into whether 
there was congressionial intent that the ATS apply extraterritorially. 
Of course, as Chief Justice Roberts himself noted, the Court in Kiobel 
was, strictly speaking, not even assessing whether the ATS ought to 
apply extraterritorially, but whether Congress intended courts to 
exercise the jurisdiction granted under the ATS in a manner that 
would have extraterritorial effect.
233
 But in any event, in conducting 
that inquiry, the Court applied a very strict rule of interpretation, 
holding that ―to rebut the presumption, the ATS would need to evince 
a ‗clear indication of extraterritoriality.‘‖234 It went on to find that the 
ATS ―covers actions by aliens for violations of the law of nations, but 
that does not imply extraterritorial reach.‖235 The Court brushed aside 
the fact that the Congress of 1789 clearly intended the ATS to apply 
to piracy,
236
 which as Justice Breyer convincingly demonstrated in 
the minority concurring opinion, is quite clearly extraterritorial.
237
 It 
similarly dismissed historical evidence regarding congressionial 
intent, stating that Attorney General Bradford‘s 1795 opinion 
regarding ATS claims arising from U.S. involvement in a French raid 
 
231. 260 U.S. 94 (1922). 
232. Id. at 98. 
233. Chief Justice Roberts notes this in his majority opinion in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). 
234. Id. at 1665. 
235. Id. 
236. Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
237. Id. at 1672–74. 
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on the British fort at Sierra Leone defied a ―definitive reading.‖238 
Such strict standards for assessing whether there was explicit 
congressionial authority to implement a law extraterritorially, or in a 
manner inconsistent with international law, stands in stark contrast to 
the manner in which the courts have considered such issues in the 
GWOT cases that I have considered here. As I have discussed, the 
courts have seldom even adverted to the question of whether the 
conduct constitutes an extraterritorial application of U.S. law. Now, 
to be sure, it is obvious that the AUMF itself is intended to apply 
beyond the territory of the United States. Its primary purpose is to 
authorize the use of force abroad. So it might be argued that courts 
have naturally not adverted to the extraterritorial aspect of conduct 
said to be authorized by the AUMF. But as I have argued, it is not at 
all clear that much of the conduct that gave rise to the cases 
considered here was in fact authorized by the AUMF. And given that 
lack of clarity, combined with the fact that the conduct was an 
extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction, and potentially inconsistent 
with principles of international law, one would have expected the 
courts to have probed the question more deeply, and to have applied 
the kind of standards that the Court did in Kiobel—if, indeed, the 
courts are really concerned with adherence to principles of 
international law and avoiding conflicts with other legal systems.  
The reasons why the conduct here under consideration may not 
have been explicitly authorized by the AUMF or any other legislation 
have been addressed above. On a purely textual reading of the statute, 
it cannot extend to the capture, interrogation, and detention of 
persons who were seized in Thailand, or the killing of persons in 
Yemen, Somalia, or Pakistan, who were not members of al-Qaeda or 
some organization that planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 
9/11 terrorist attacks.
239
 Moreover, the process by which persons 
have been determined to be ―enemy combatants‖ in the detention 
context is flawed, while in the targeted killing context it remains 
entirely unknown. In the end, the courts have not applied the kind of 
strict interpretation seen in the Court‘s construction of the ATS in 
Kiobel, in assessing the explicit statutory authority to engage in this 
conduct within the GWOT. 
 
238. Id. at 1668 (majority opinion). 
239. At least not before the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011), which is understood to have 
expanded the scope of the authority to use force beyond that provided in the AUMF. 
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One final point needs to be addressed regarding the issue of 
domestic authority. Some might argue that even if this impugned 
conduct is not explicitly authorized by Congress, it comes within the 
Commander-in-Chief authority of the President, pursuant to Article 
II, Section 2 of the Constitution.
240
 This of course implicates an old 
and very contentious debate over the war powers under the 
Constitution of the United States, and the exact contours of executive 
and legislative control over decisions to use military force.
241
 Without 
delving into the particulars of that debate, I would suggest that the 
better view is that the President has authority to decide how and 
where to employ military force within an armed conflict, but cannot 
initiate armed conflict or use force against another state without 
congressionial approval.
242
 In the context of my arguments above, the 
first point to be made is that the courts in none of these GWOT cases 
even look to Commander-in-Chief authority. But in any event, within 
the context of the detention, torture, and targeted killing debate, once 
again we come back to the question of whether such conduct was 
legitimately part of an armed conflict or not. If it is not, then of 
course one could argue that the Commander-in-Chief power does not 
authorize detaining or killing someone in a foreign country, though 
the more hawkish advocates of executive power would disagree. But 
in any event, even the strongest advocates of more aggressive 
positions on war powers and the Commander-in-Chief authority 
acknowledge that there is deep disagreement, and no settled position 
on the issue.
243
 Thus, precisely because the issues surrounding war 
powers remain contentious and are unsettled, one would expect the 
courts to make some inquiry into whether the conduct in question 
might have nonetheless required congressionial authorization, and if 
 
240. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 1. 
241. See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (2d ed. 2004); THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION AND THE POWER TO GO TO WAR (Gary M. Stern & Morton H. Halperin eds., 
1994); JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005); John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The 
Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 242–52 (1996); JOHN HART 
ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 
(1993). 
242. I have previously written about war powers under the U.S. Constitution. See Martin, 
supra note 49, at 36–38, 58–61. 
243. See Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, 115 YALE 
L.J. 2512 (2006). But see FISHER, supra note 241, at 15 (arguing that Yoo, as the most 
aggressive advocate of executive war powers, is virtually alone in his interpretation of the 
intent of the drafters of the war powers clause of the Constitution). 
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so, whether Congress had provided authority that unambiguously 
applied to the circumstances in the particular case. 
V. CONCLUSIONS – KIOBEL AND THE ―GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR‖ 
This examination of extraterritoriality in a small sample of 
GWOT cases is all too brief and admittedly incomplete. But let us 
recall the reason for the exploration. The primary purpose for this 
study of GWOT cases was to examine how the federal courts have 
considered issues of extraterritoriality in other cases involving claims 
regarding violations of jus cogens norms in international law. In other 
words, it began as an inquiry aimed at providing some insight into the 
Court‘s reasons for delving into the issues of extraterritoriality in 
Kiobel. In so doing, however, the inquiry, brief and incomplete as it 
may be, has raised some significant questions about the approach of 
the federal courts in the GWOT cases. In essence, the inquiry began 
with the thought that GWOT cases might shed light on Kiobel, but in 
the end, the inquiry through the lens of the Kiobel judgment may 
shed some light on our approach to the GWOT, and may contribute 
to beginning a fruitful discussion on some under-evaluated aspects of 
the GWOT policies and jurisprudence. 
Why this inquiry to begin with? How and why would the GWOT 
cases shed any light on the Court‘s approach to Kiobel? The starting 
point was that the Court‘s diversion into the issue of extraterritoriality 
was odd. There is good reason to believe that the ATS does not 
constitute an extraterritorial application of U.S. law, or to be more 
precise, an exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction in violation of the 
international law principles on jurisdiction, or domestic presumptions 
against extraterritoriality. The Court‘s own interpretation of the ATS 
in Sosa supports the view that the ATS is purely a grant of 
jurisdiction to federal courts to recognize and adjudicate causes of 
action in tort for violations of international law. Such exercise of 
adjudicative jurisdiction, particularly in relation to violations of jus 
cogens norms in respect of which international law recognizes 
universal jurisdiction in any event, is entirely consistent with 
international law principles on jurisdiction. The fact that there is little 
or no connection to the United States in so-called foreign-cubed cases 
does not significantly alter this analysis.  
The next step was to consider how the Court, and the federal 
courts generally, have treated extraterritoriality in relation to other 
cases involving claims arising from violations of the same jus cogens 
norms that were at issue in Kiobel, but in which there is a greater 
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U.S. connection. The government‘s conduct in the so-called GWOT 
has given rise to a number of cases in which there were precisely 
such claims regarding the violation of international law prohibitions 
on indefinite and arbitrary detention, torture, and extrajudicial killing, 
and in which there was a much stronger U.S. connection. Several of 
these cases involved claims under the ATS itself. The examination of 
these cases, however, ended up revealing some surprising and 
important features about the government‘s conduct in the GWOT, 
and about how the federal courts have treated such conduct, and even 
how the relevant bar and the academy have understood the policy and 
resulting jurisprudence. These observations are significant in their 
own right, quite apart from Kiobel, and they can be reduced to a few 
key points.  
First, the conduct of the U.S. government that gave rise to the 
claims in these cases—that is the capture of foreigners in foreign 
lands and then subjecting them to indefinite detention, the 
interrogation and torture of several of such detainees, and the 
extrajudicial killing of persons in foreign territory in which the 
United States is not involved in armed conflict—itself constitutes the 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law. Or, to put it more precisely, it 
constitutes the exercise of U.S. prescriptive and enforcement 
jurisdiction with respect to foreigners in foreign territory. Moreover, 
in several of these instances, this extraterritorial exercise of 
jurisdiction is arguably in violation of the international law principles 
on jurisdiction; the conduct cannot be said to constitute the 
implementation of, or be authorized by, the international law of 
armed conflict; and the congressionial authority for such conduct has 
been less than certain, meaning that the domestic presumptions apply 
and have not been rebutted. 
Second, the courts, including the Supreme Court, in considering 
these cases, have not analyzed the question of whether such conduct 
represents an impermissibly extraterritorial application of U.S. law. 
Indeed, the question is virtually never raised. Rather, to the extent 
that extraterritoriality is raised as an issue in these cases, all the focus 
is on whether various rights under U.S. law can be applied 
extraterritorially to protect foreigners who are made subject to the 
exercise of U.S. jurisdiction in foreign territory. In light of this 
inquiry, I find this feature in particular to be strange: that courts 
should be so concerned with the question of extraterritorial 
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application of rights, and go so far as to express apprehension over 
the possibility that extending rights to foreigners in the grips of U.S. 
power in foreign territory might cause friction in foreign relations or 
infringe international law principles on jurisdiction; while at the same 
time being so entirely oblivious of the fact that the government‘s 
conduct in detaining, torturing, and killing those foreigners in foreign 
lands should itself constitute egregious exercises of U.S. jurisdiction 
in violation of not only principles of jurisdiction, but also 
fundamental human rights principles under international law. 
Moreover, it is interesting to note that the academic literature on the 
GWOT jurisprudence has similarly focused on the extraterritorial 
application of rights, while apparently ignoring the question of 
whether the conduct giving rise to the claims is itself an 
impermissible exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
The third observation is in relation to the contrasting standards 
that are applied in the various contexts. The courts have applied 
broad statutory interpretations and generous standards in finding legal 
authority (and, by implication, explicit congressionial intent that the 
law operate abroad) for the government exercise of jurisdiction in the 
GWOT. In some cases, the courts have extended the authority of the 
AUMF far beyond what the language can support. In contrast with 
that, the Court applied strict and narrow interpretations of the ATS 
and employed high standards for establishing congressionial intent in 
Kiobel itself. Similarly, the courts employed strict standards of 
statutory interpretation and mobilized various doctrines to limit the 
extraterritorial reach of habeas corpus and other U.S. legal rights to 
claimants under U.S. jurisdiction abroad, as well as for the purpose of 
insulating and immunizing U.S. defendants from the claims of such 
plaintiffs in the GWOT cases. The manner in which the courts 
employed the concept of nexus perhaps reflects the most obvious 
disparity. On the one hand, the courts have required a substantial 
connection to the United States to ground ATS claims (except in the 
case of Al-Aulaqi, in which too great a connection was one basis for 
rejecting his claim), have held that the link between the U.S. and 
Syrian agents acting on its behalf in torturing a rendered subject was 
insufficient to trigger liability, and have required claimants to be 
clearly within U.S. territorial jurisdiction in order to avail themselves 
of U.S. legal rights. Yet the courts at the same time have accepted the 
most tenuous nexus to al-Qaeda, often on the basis of weak and often 
dubious evidence, and have even extended the AUMF to persons 
unrelated to al-Qaeda and captured in non-conflict countries years 
after 9/11 for providing ―material support‖ to amorphous associated 
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forces, as the basis for legitimating U.S. government action in 
detaining and interrogating claimants. 
There are, of course, counter-arguments to my proposition that 
U.S. conduct constitutes the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction, in 
likely violation of both U.S. domestic presumptions and international 
law principles on jurisdiction. But I have tried to argue that those 
objections too can be answered. Some readers may not find my 
responses to the ―likely objections‖ persuasive. In other words, it may 
be argued that the courts in these cases were entirely right not to 
consider extraterritoriality issues, precisely because the conduct was 
clearly authorized by Congress in legislation that was explicitly 
intended to apply extraterritorially, and in any event it was consistent 
with and authorized by the international law of armed conflict, and 
came within the exceptions to the international law prohibition on 
extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction. In short, the courts were 
doctrinally correct, and there was no issue to explore or express 
concern over.  
Others may think that these cases in fact reflect the kind of ―grey 
holes‖ that are created when courts are excessively deferential to 
executive power in times of armed conflict or national emergency, 
which reflects an unfortunate but inevitable erosion of the thick rule 
of law.
244
 But no matter what one may think on the technical merits 
of these decisions, I want to argue that we should nonetheless step 
back and consider the broader pattern that this exploration provides. 
That is, that U.S. law is being applied extraterritorially in the GWOT 
in ways that, quite aside from possibly violating substantive 
principles of human rights and humanitarian law, are violating the 
international law principles on jurisdiction—the very issue that 
purportedly caused the Court such concern in oral argument in 
Kiobel. If we care about international law principles on jurisdiction 
and are concerned about the extraterritorial application of domestic 
law, we should recognize and study further this aspect of the GWOT. 
Moreover, it is not only an issue of how the courts have treated this 
issue. We should be asking why Congress has not addressed the 
 
244. See Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095 
(2009) (suggesting that such grey holes are inevitable in times of crisis); David Dyzenhaus, 
Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency Inside or Outside the Legal Order? 27 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 2005 (2006) (arguing that such gray holes are not inevitable and are to be resisted in 
defense of the rule of law). 
9-Martin  8/28/2013  9:25 PM 
2013] KIOBEL, EXTRATERRITORIALITY, AND THE ―GWOT‖ 207 
question. It may decide to entirely support the conduct here in 
question—though in so doing it should consider carefully whether the 
conduct complies with U.S. obligations under international law—but 
if Congress supports the conduct, it should pass legislation to provide 
an explicit legal foundation for it. 
In the end, the judgment in Kiobel has left the ATS all but dead 
to claimants seeking to enforce rights against foreign defendants, and 
many human rights advocates will profoundly regret the decision for 
this reason. But the issue of extraterritoriality remains very much 
alive, and perhaps the Court‘s judgment in Kiobel will contribute to a 
renewed inquiry into the nature and legitimacy of the extraterritorial 
exercise of U.S. jurisdiction in the so-called ―global war on terror.‖ 
